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Case: **Community Engagement Panel  
Public Meeting**

**Transcript of Proceedings**

Date: **04/16/2015**

Job #: **596487**

Court Reporting – Videoconferencing – Trial Presentation – Nationwide Networking

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SAN ONOFRE DECOMMISSIONING  
COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT PANEL MEETING  
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF ORANGE

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS  
SAN JUAN CAPISTRANO, CALIFORNIA  
THURSDAY, APRIL 16, 2015

Reported by:  
CARLOS R. HICHO  
CSR No. 13111  
Job No. 596487

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SAN ONOFRE DECOMMISSIONING  
COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT PANEL MEETING  
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF ORANGE

Transcript of proceedings, taken at  
25925 Camino Del Avion, San Juan  
Capistrano, California 92675, commencing at  
the hour of 6:13 P.M., THURSDAY, APRIL 16,  
2015, before CARLOS R. HICHO,  
CSR No. 13111.

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PANEL APPEARANCES :

DAVID G. VICTOR  
CHAIRMAN

CEP MEMBERS :

TOM PALMISANO  
VICE PRESIDENT, DECOMMISSION  
AND CHIEF NUCLEAR OFFICER AT SONGS

DAN STETSON  
OCEAN INSTITUTE

JEROME M. "JERRY" KERN  
OCEANSIDE CITI COUNCILMEMBER

GARRY BROWN  
ORANGE COUNTY COASTKEEPER

DONNA BOSTON  
ORANGE COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT

RICH HAYDON  
CALIFORNIA STATE PARKS

MAYOR TIM BROWN  
SAN CLEMENTE

SUPERVISOR BILL HORN  
SAN DIEGO COUNTY

DR. WILLIAM PARKER  
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE

JOHN ALPAY  
CAPISTRANO UNIFIED SCHOOL BOARD

VAL MACEDO  
LOCAL 89 SAN DIEGO

(Continued.)

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PANEL MEMBER APPEARANCES :

GLENN PASCALL  
SIERRA CLUB

ROSS QUAM  
NRC  
SITE SECURITY MANAGER

CARLOS OLVERA  
MAYOR DANA POINT

PAM PATTERSON  
SAN JUAN CAPISTRANO  
MAYOR PRO TEM

MARK HAIRE  
CHIEF PLANT SUPPORT BRANCH

DUANE WHITE  
NRC PROJECT MANAGER

RICHARD MCPHERSON  
AMERICAN NUCLEAR SOCIETY

TOM CAUGHLAN  
CAMP PENDLETON

JIM LEACH  
SOUTH ORANGE COUNTY ECONOMIC COALITION

1 THURSDAY, APRIL 16, 2015

2 SAN JUAN CAPISTRANO, CALIFORNIA

3 6:13 P.M.

4 \* \* \*

5 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Hi, good evening. Thanks,  
6 everyone, for your patience, in particular, given the  
7 incredible difficulties on the roads this evening.

8 My name is David Victor and I'm the Chairman  
9 of the Community Engagement Panel and I'm really  
10 pleased to welcome everybody here to the second  
11 official meeting of the Community Engagement Panel,  
12 regular meeting of the Community Engagement Panel this  
13 year, not only on behalf of my myself but also Tim  
14 Brown, vice chairman, and Dan Stetson, secretary.

15 Before we get started, just a reminder, we've  
16 been to this facility several times before and I'm  
17 really delightful that the community of San Juan  
18 Capistrano can allow us to use this facility.

19 Should there be a need to evacuate, you can go  
20 out through the exits over there or back through the  
21 door that you came in when -- when -- when you arrived.

22 We have two CHP officers with us this evening.  
23 I want to thank you for your service here, for our  
24 safety. And if there's anything that we can do to help  
25 you, please don't hesitate to let me know.

1 I just want to remind everyone that the CEP  
2 is -- is not a decision-making body, we don't have  
3 decision-making procedures, we're not designed to make  
4 official decisions, we're not a regulatory body, we're  
5 not a financial oversight body; we were designed as a  
6 conduit between the local communities around the plant  
7 and Edison, both directions, so that Edison can  
8 understand what people in the communities are worried  
9 about and how they can address those worries and  
10 vice versa.

11 And so the idea is that we have focused  
12 conversations around a handful of very important topics  
13 as this plant goes through the various stages of  
14 decommissioning and we hear, in a fairly structured  
15 way, what the community cares about and we also, in the  
16 communities, learn about the decommissioning process  
17 and what to expect and a variety of other things.

18 While we don't make decisions, there have been  
19 some areas where we've had very important discussions  
20 and we can get a sense of the CEP and a sense of the  
21 conversations in the communities and then go off and  
22 hopefully help do things and we're going to have one  
23 topic on that tonight later about the issues  
24 surrounding consolidated interim storage and the moving  
25 of the spent nuclear fuel away from the site as soon as

1 practical.

2 I want to introduce new members of the CEP  
3 since our last meeting: Mayor pro tem Pam Patterson  
4 from San Juan Capistrano -- right here. Pam,  
5 welcome -- replacing Larry Kraemer.

6 Mayor Carlos Olvera from Dana Point. Mayor,  
7 welcome, replacing Lisa Bartlett, who moved to a  
8 different role. Lisa Bartlett is the superintendent  
9 from Orange County in the 5th District, replacing Pat  
10 Bates. Lisa Bartlett is unable to be here tonight, but  
11 she is represented by Victor Cowell, who is in the  
12 audience right here.

13 And so if you have any messages you would like  
14 to pass on to Lisa Bartlett, I'm sure that you would  
15 help us convey those and also convey the sense of the  
16 meeting tonight.

17 Also, I want to welcome Glenn Pascall, right  
18 here, from the Sierra Club, replacing Gene Stone. And  
19 Tom Caughlan, Camp Pendleton, down at the end there,  
20 replacing Larry Rannals. This is Tom's second meeting  
21 in this capacity.

22 I want to remind everybody that the website  
23 [www.SONGS.community.com](http://www.SONGS.community.com), it went down for a couple of  
24 days. I'm not sure who was hacking whom, but in the  
25 case it's been de-hacked and is now up.

1           And if you want to have a walking tour of the  
2 facility, there are dates on the website and I think  
3 there is more information on how to sign up for those  
4 walking tours there. More than 300 people have toured  
5 the facility so far, and all reports I've heard of is  
6 that these are very interesting and important tours.  
7 And so, please, go to that site and get more  
8 information.

9           On the same site, you will find live streaming  
10 of this meeting here as well as archival copies of  
11 prior meetings and transcripts and all meeting  
12 materials. Every document that we send around to the  
13 CEP becomes a public document, we post it on that site,  
14 and then, every once in a while, I get a lot of  
15 correspondence from folks that this is of large  
16 importance for the CEP and so I share with the CEP and  
17 then also post all that correspondence on the website  
18 as well. And if you think somebody -- something needs  
19 to be up there, let us know and we'll do our -- our  
20 very best to be transparent and efficient in all of  
21 this.

22           I also want to acknowledge that we have  
23 several guests here from the Nuclear Regulatory  
24 Commission. The topic of tonight's meeting is not  
25 spent fuel. We will spend a little bit of time on

1 spent fuel, but the topic of tonight's meeting is  
2 security and the regulatory arrangements around  
3 security.

4 And folks who are visiting us from the NRC are  
5 here to help us talk about those issues and so, please,  
6 bear with us if you ask questions and are interested in  
7 NRC responses around other topics, such as spent fuel,  
8 that they may not be able to address those.

9 Duane White -- where's Duane? There you go.  
10 Duane, thank you very much. Mark Haire. And in the  
11 audience, observing, we have Tom Weingart, Senior  
12 Project Manager of SONGS for the NRC. Tom, thank you  
13 very much. He is part of the Office of Nuclear Reactor  
14 regulation in the Division of Operating Reactor  
15 License.

16 A couple of more announcements and we'll get  
17 on to the agenda: Members of the public, we're going  
18 to have a public comment period. The short delay at  
19 the beginning of today's meeting will not affect the  
20 length of the public comment period.

21 If you want to make a comment, go ahead and  
22 fill out one of these cards and indicate the topic on  
23 which you want to make a comment and we're going to do  
24 what we've done in the past, which is to group comments  
25 together thematically and try and summarize those and

1 ask people if we got it right and have a little more  
2 back-and-forth between the public and people who are  
3 responding to these comments so that we don't just have  
4 a ping-pong in three minutes, in three minutes, in  
5 three minutes.

6 But if you just want to get up and speak about  
7 something that's not listed here, then just write down  
8 you want to speak. The people who are -- who want to  
9 make public comments around the themes of tonight's  
10 meeting, they'll go first, but we will make sure we'll  
11 do our very best to make sure that everyone who wants  
12 to make a comment will have the opportunity to do that.

13 The agendas have been -- are in very fine  
14 print and so you have a copy, I think, in every chair  
15 of the agenda, so that you can see where we're headed.  
16 The presentations from the -- from Edison have been  
17 posted on the SONGScommunity.com website already.

18 And I just want to remind panel members to  
19 please identify yourselves when you speak so that we  
20 have that information on the live stream. As items  
21 come up, I'm going to call them out. Dan, and Tim, and  
22 I will call them out so that we keep a record of the  
23 main items that come up for action tonight and then we  
24 can get Edison or other relevant folks to respond to  
25 those action items and keep the information as useful

1 and focused as possible.

2 Before we continue with the rest of the  
3 agenda, I want to ask CNO of Edison, Chief Nuclear  
4 Officer of Edison, Tom Palmisano, to make a few  
5 announcements.

6 MR. PALMISANO: Okay. Thank you, David. I am Tom  
7 Palmisano, vice president of decommissioning and the  
8 chief nuclear officer. In addition to welcoming the  
9 new panel members -- we're pleased to have you on  
10 board -- one comment: Over the last year you've met  
11 Chris Thompson and Chris carried the title of vice  
12 president of decommissioning while I carried the title  
13 of Chief Nuclear Officer.

14 Chris has completed his assignment to the  
15 decommissioning project; moved on to other projects  
16 within Edison, so I'm combining both roles as vice  
17 President of Decommissioning and Chief Nuclear Officer.

18 Chris's focus was largely in some of the  
19 corporate activities in support of the site and those  
20 activities are important and continue to be important,  
21 but we're combining both of those responsibilities  
22 under my position.

23 So Chris could not be here tonight due to  
24 another commitment. He wanted to convey his  
25 appreciation to all the panel members and all the

1 members of the public who have contributed to help make  
2 the first year of the Community Engagement Panel  
3 successful and looks forward to our continued success.

4 In a dialogue, understanding we may not always  
5 agree on things, but we need a more open and  
6 transparent dialogue. So, Chris -- we thank Chris for  
7 his service and wish him well, and he wishes us well in  
8 our future endeavors as a Community Engagement Panel.

9 So, thank you, David.

10 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Thank you very much, Tom. And  
11 one of the many things that Chris helped us do is  
12 understand the landscape in Washington, the federal  
13 legislative landscape in particular, and that really  
14 relates to the first item that's on our agenda tonight,  
15 which concerns long-term spent fuel storage and, not  
16 just storage, moving the fuel off site.

17 As everyone knows, this is a very, very  
18 important issue, this is a highly emotive issue, and  
19 this is an issue where our options are not as ideal as  
20 we would want them. In the ideal world, we would see a  
21 clean line of sight for the fuel to come out of the  
22 pools and then put into casks, a process that is now  
23 underway and to be completed by around 2019, and then  
24 moved promptly off site to a permanent repository,  
25 Yucca Mountain.

1           That option is not dead, but that option --  
2           the odds of that option working, the Yucca Mountain  
3           option, those odds have diminished for a variety of  
4           political reasons, environmental reasons, and a variety  
5           of other things and so on.

6           And that might change, it might not change,  
7           but it seemed incumbent upon us to start thinking about  
8           other ways to move the fuel out of our communities into  
9           some other place where it could be stored more securely  
10          and certainly not along the side of the highway here to  
11          allow the complete elimination of the plant,  
12          decommissioning of the plant, and removal of the fuel,  
13          and I think everyone is rowing in the same direction on  
14          that. There are a lot of different ideas about  
15          different strategies for doing that. We've spent a lot  
16          of time over the last 14-15 months talking about these  
17          issues.

18          One of the things that's emerged in those  
19          conversations is that the idea of consolidated interim  
20          storage and, I guess, as Bill Clinton would say, it  
21          depends on what you mean by "interim" and on "storage."

22          But the idea that you would consolidate  
23          storage spent fuel from a variety of sites, especially  
24          decommissioned sites like the one here, where there is  
25          no reason for the fuel to be there for the long haul

1 because the site itself is non-operational producing  
2 electricity, the idea of consolidating that fuel in a  
3 small, in a few interim storage facilities where it can  
4 be put under lock and guard, where it can be stored  
5 efficiently, including economically efficiently away  
6 from populations, and then eventually moved to  
7 permanent repository, that makes a whole lot of sense.

8 And with the difficulties in Yucca Mountain,  
9 the private sector itself has come in and it's now  
10 looking at a variety of possible solutions and  
11 strategies in this area.

12 At our last meeting in January, it became  
13 clear, at least to me and I think to many other members  
14 of the CEP and the broad public that we might -- one of  
15 the things we might do in the communities around the  
16 plant is help push along practical consolidated interim  
17 storage and that can be done through some kind of  
18 California strategy by which I don't necessarily mean  
19 the facility would be in California.

20 Some people want it to be in California, some  
21 people want it to be on military basis in California,  
22 some people don't want it in California at all, they  
23 want it in some other state. It seems like there's a  
24 lot of places where you can put it.

25 But if we start getting serious about

1 consolidated interim storage, there are a lot of really  
2 important practical things that need to be worked on in  
3 terms of the strategy before this can be a reality. We  
4 can imagine lots of cool things that can be done, but  
5 there are a lot of really important things that need to  
6 be worked on in some detail.

7           There is some important regulatory questions,  
8 there's some questions; about whether new law would be  
9 needed, there's some questions about how you would fund  
10 all of this because the trust fund for spent fuel is  
11 tied up, focused on Yucca.

12           And it's not entirely clear how much -- which  
13 of those funds could be used for other purposes, a  
14 variety of other things, including some very important  
15 technical questions about how you would move the fuel,  
16 which fuel would be moved first, how would we sequence  
17 it; those are lots of issues that people at our last  
18 meeting, who are experts in this business, spent time  
19 talking about and which -- and those conversations have  
20 continued in the month or two since that last meeting.

21           To make a long story short, I put together,  
22 with Dan's help and Tim's help and a lot of input from  
23 a variety of experts in the industry, including the  
24 folks at BPC, who sponsored the last meeting we had  
25 here, put together a concept memo that outlined what

1 might be done in terms of developing a California  
2 strategy and, in particular, what we might do to ask  
3 the California Energy Commission and the governor's  
4 office for help developing this kind of strategy.

5           And so I wanted to pause now and see if there  
6 are members of the CEP who wanted to comment on that  
7 4-or 5-page memo, there's a brief summary of it right  
8 in the beginning of the memo, and if they had any  
9 particular views about this. I think the three of us  
10 believe that this memo reflects the sense of the  
11 conversations that we've had so far in the CEP, but we  
12 want to make sure that that's true and, if that's true,  
13 then we need to go off and do some spadework and help  
14 get this started and a cause to come back to the  
15 communities here and maybe there are resolutions in  
16 local town councils and other forums that would be  
17 supportive for that and I look forward to having those  
18 conversations.

19           So let me pause here and ask the members of  
20 the CEP if anybody would like to comment on that memo.

21           Glenn Pascall?

22           MR. PASCALL: First of all, I -- loved its  
23 energized spirit. We've gotten into a mindset in this  
24 country where we view this situation as a total hiatus  
25 and deadlock. Well, most other advanced nations that

1 have made any commitment in nuclear have moved much  
2 farther ahead in solving the storage problem, so I  
3 commend you for the re-igniting of energies to address  
4 this issue.

5           Secondly, it is actually the only aspect of  
6 all of the issues we're wrestling with where the Sierra  
7 Club has had a position for 30 years, which is to move  
8 waste from closed plants sites that are often in  
9 sensitive locations, that's been a consistent position  
10 for over 30 years; and very happy to see it directly  
11 addressed.

12           Thirdly, I think it's an issue where within  
13 this body and within the group of attendees at the  
14 meetings there is wider agreement than there is on some  
15 of the technical issues where people have, in very  
16 passionate and committed ways, presented a wide range  
17 of options that have not been resolved on one approach.  
18 There is a wider area of agreement here.

19           And somewhat out of order, I want to mention  
20 that, by serendipity, and you may already know this,  
21 Mr. Chairman, Ray Lutz informed me that the California  
22 Energy Commission is meeting on April 27th on what  
23 appears to be this issue and, if true, you know,  
24 important, if true, and it would indicate that our  
25 timing may be good to tie in with the process.

1           CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Yes. And I just want to -- well,  
2 thank you very much, Glenn. And let me just say I'm  
3 not igniting passions here, hopefully I'm channeling  
4 passions that were already on fire. So I'm not sure  
5 who is responsible for the original spark, but passion,  
6 nonetheless, is being channeled.

7           MR. PASCALL: Actually, energy, I think, is the  
8 term I used.

9           CHAIRMAN VICTOR: And, I believe, Tom Palmisano as  
10 well was involved in that meeting. I've been asked to  
11 speak at that meeting and I've said, yes, I'm happy to  
12 speak about what's happening here, and I've very  
13 studiously not told them what I'm going to speak about  
14 because I wanted to wait and see what the sense of the  
15 CEP was about this kind of initiative, which I think  
16 reflects what we were thinking about doing.

17           Tom, do you want to comment on this?

18           MR. PALMISANO: Yes, let me make a comment. On one  
19 of my slides later in the presentation I have this  
20 meeting listed because we've been asked to make the  
21 public more aware of meetings where decommissioning  
22 topics are going to arise.

23           This is the California Energy Commission  
24 workshop in Sacramento on April 27 in the afternoon.  
25 We have invited to speak Jim Madigan, from our staff,

1 will speak. And this is part of the California Energy  
2 Commission's process, that every couple of years update  
3 an energy report for California.

4 The workshop topic on that Monday is Nuclear  
5 and there's going to be topics related to Diablo  
6 Canyon, to San Onofre decommissioning. The NRC will be  
7 out to speak, Mr. Larry Camper, who spoke to us several  
8 times.

9 And part of the panel will be on spent fuel  
10 storage, where we will speak. I believe, David Victor  
11 is on the agenda, David Lockbaum, from the Union of  
12 Concerned Scientists, and there may be another rep.

13 And the agenda is publicly available, so I'll  
14 ask our folks to put it on the SONGS Community website,  
15 but it's also on the California Energy Commission  
16 website.

17 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Thank you ver much. And now Gary  
18 Brown and then Richard McPherson. Gary?

19 MR. BROWN: Yes. I was -- I too was delighted to  
20 see the memo and, I think, at our very first meeting we  
21 talked about a need to go forward and need to wake up  
22 some other agencies, in particular the state, and get  
23 them talking with the Federal Government.

24 I think -- I think there could be a California  
25 solution and, certainly, that's better than having five

1 separate storage locations just in California. I've --  
2 it's going to be interesting -- because of the design  
3 of the CEP, it's going to be interesting to see how we  
4 promote something from the CEP when we really don't  
5 have the authority to order lunch, so I -- I think  
6 that's going to be a nice fence to walk.

7 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay. Well, I just assumed  
8 you're ordering lunch for us.

9 MR. STETSON: You can order it, you'll just have to  
10 pay for us.

11 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: And let me just say one more word  
12 about, specifically, what I think is on the table,  
13 which is, we can't do all the corralling that's  
14 necessary because we're not a decision-making body and  
15 also we don't have the -- we're not an arm of the  
16 government.

17 The logical place to do this is the California  
18 Energy Commission, which in the past has done some  
19 things related to fuel storage and the Energy  
20 Commission we could ask, with the Governor's support,  
21 them to develop basically the elements of the strategy,  
22 not to make decisions about a strategy, where they  
23 would look and we would, in the memo, as you know, have  
24 outlined what we think some of the key questions would  
25 be and some of those questions have come from a lot of

1 technical input we've had from various experts in this  
2 area.

3 We also would want them to take a look at the  
4 question of whether it's -- it would be useful to look  
5 at California locations for this or whether we think to  
6 private-market on its own. There's several projects  
7 that are emerging just almost spontaneously from  
8 private industry, with a private market on its own.

9 We've produced site, there's one interesting  
10 site developing very rapidly in West Texas. I think --  
11 I think those are up in questions here (indicating).

12 Richard McPherson, do you want to comment on  
13 this?

14 MR. MCPHERSON: Your memo -- the memo is great.  
15 And all of you guys have worked on it. I really  
16 appreciate it. I started following nuclear in  
17 California very closely with the Sundesert nuclear  
18 power plants just after the California Energy  
19 Commission was stood up.

20 And I've been to an awful lot of meetings and  
21 awful lot of documents and this is the first document  
22 that I've seen since before that meeting that is  
23 positive for everybody concerned to try to move  
24 forward.

25 As we do, I'd like you to think a couple of

1 things: One is, while San Onofre is being  
2 decommissioned, we have some other sites with  
3 decommissioned plants in California already where fuel  
4 is stored. We also have, ultimately, Diablo Canyon  
5 would be dealt with some day.

6 But while we're looking in California, you  
7 might want to consider what's west of the Rockies.  
8 There are not that many nuclear power plants west of  
9 the Rockies, the only states involved west of the  
10 Rockies as far as nuclear power, commercial nuclear  
11 power, there's Oregon, Washington, and California,  
12 Arizona -- nobody else has any.

13 So I think that we have an opportunity here to  
14 start the initiative here in California, but to  
15 enjoining those other, at least inform them of the  
16 process, that we're doing here.

17 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: That is exactly right. Well  
18 said. We're going to need -- are there comments people  
19 want to make about this? (Brief pause).

20 So, I guess, I'm going to -- with your  
21 license, Dan, Tim, and I are going to start doing some  
22 poking around at the Energy Commission about how this  
23 would be done, the governor's office.

24 Why don't we commit to report back to at our  
25 next meeting as to where that seems to stand? And also

1 if members of the CEP and members of the community have  
2 advise on things that local communities can do,  
3 including an alliance with communities around other  
4 plants. You mentioned Diablo, in particular. I would  
5 think those are all going to be natural allies, and so  
6 we should work on that.

7 And let's get this started. We said, you  
8 know, a year or so ago we wanted to focus not just on  
9 what's done at this plant, but also how we could help  
10 kind of reinvigorate a Federal strategy here and I  
11 think this will be a big part of that. So, excellent.

12 Well, thank you very much.

13 And so why don't we move now to the next topic  
14 in the meeting, which is the main topic of today's  
15 meeting, and that is security at San Onofre both the  
16 regulations and the plan. There are several elements  
17 to this segment of the meeting and so I'm going to ask  
18 Tom Palmisano to give us an introduction and then guide  
19 us through that -- this segment. Tom?

20 MR. PALMISANO: Okay. Thank you, David.

21 Manuel, can you advance the slides, please?

22 Okay. Tonight's main topic is -- is Plant  
23 Security and then later I'll have the typical  
24 Decommissioning update. We'll talk a bit about spent  
25 fuel storage at San Onofre, but we wanted to start off

1 with the main topic tonight.

2 The security topic was identified last year by  
3 CET -- CEP as a list of topics. Overtime, we would  
4 like to visit with the CEP and public, so this is our  
5 first time really talking in any depths about plant  
6 security.

7 We are pleased that the NRC has joined us  
8 tonight. They're going to give an overview from their  
9 perspective of security regulations and requirements  
10 and how they inspect. I'm going to introduce Ross  
11 Quam. Ross? Ross is the site security manager.

12 And over the next year, we're going to have  
13 more of the plant people talking to the CEP on specific  
14 topics. So, Ross is up first tonight. And so Ross  
15 will do the bulk of the presentation on San Onofre  
16 security. I'll handle some questions as well after the  
17 NRC speaks.

18 Now, security is a challenging topic to talk  
19 about because a number of specific details about  
20 security, either what the threats are, what the  
21 specific capabilities of the site are mandated by NRC,  
22 inspected by the NRC, provided by us, but they're  
23 considered safeguard information and are security  
24 sensitive that are prohibited from public disclosure,  
25 and as you can imagine, for a very valid reason.

1           So this information is closely inspected by  
2 the NRC. We're going to talk in appropriate terms to  
3 give you, I think, a pretty good feel of plant  
4 security. Ross and I will be answering -- he will  
5 answer some questions to a certain depth, but at some  
6 point here I may say that's safeguard to security  
7 sensitive information. We can't give you any more  
8 specifics.

9           So -- and I know that may be frustrating, but  
10 you need to appreciate the rules that we follow for  
11 something like that. So with that, I think this will  
12 be a good discussion and we're looking forward to panel  
13 questions and then, later on, public questions.

14           So with that, let me turn it over to Ross.

15           So, Ross, go ahead.

16           MR. QUAM: All right. Good evening, members of the  
17 panel, members of the public. As Tom said, I have the  
18 unique and fun-filled opportunity to talk to you all  
19 about things that I can't talk to you about. So, as we  
20 go through, I'll be keeping the -- our NRC guests on  
21 their toes because they're going to see some words that  
22 might make them think I'm going to go down the wrong  
23 path.

24           MR. PALMISANO: And, Ross, probably -- I should  
25 probably turn it over to the NRC first. Would you like

1 to cover your aspect first here?

2 MR. WHITE: If we can.

3 MR. PALMISANO: Yes, Ross, why don't -- this is  
4 showing the field goal-kicker, Ross.

5 MR. QUAM: Got it.

6 MR. PALMISANO: So, okay.

7 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: You said too much.

8 MR. WHITE: My name is Duane White. As they  
9 mentioned, I've been serving as the project manager for  
10 security or NRC project manager for security for  
11 San Onofre, and so I wanted to briefly just kind of go  
12 over NRC structure. Basically, I'm at NRC's  
13 headquarters in Rockville, Maryland, in Washington, DC,  
14 area.

15 And you probably know, but NRC, we are the  
16 ones that basically develop the regulations with safety  
17 and security, with radioactive materials. We also  
18 develop guidance for our licensees so that they have an  
19 understanding of what is required to meet those  
20 requirements, and we also review and approve licenses  
21 and we approve, in this category, the security plans  
22 that the licensees have to prepare.

23 We also have four regional offices that  
24 basically cover the oversight of the licensees,  
25 basically, through performing inspections. The primary

1 regulation that we require licensees to follow for  
2 security is under what we call Title 10, Code of  
3 Federal Regulations, Part 73, so 10CFR Part 73, which  
4 is basically physical protection of plants and  
5 materials.

6           The primary purpose of this regulation is to  
7 prescribe requirements, I would say, for the  
8 establishment and maintenance of a physical protection  
9 program for protecting special nuclear material, and so  
10 I just wanted to emphasize that the requirements are  
11 for special nuclear material which, in this case, it  
12 would be the fuel, the spent fuel, that you've been  
13 talking about.

14           And so the requirements that the plant had  
15 before, they decommissioned. So when they were  
16 operating, they had to follow the same requirements as  
17 a decommissioned plant. So we still make sure that  
18 they do that through -- through our inspection program.

19           I will note that, you know, I think there are  
20 questions as far as the decommissioning. There are  
21 changes possibly in the protective strategy of how they  
22 do it but that's because, you know, now that they no  
23 longer had the reactive vessels and some of the safety  
24 equipment, of course, the size of the plant, the  
25 operations of the plant that's necessary have reduced,

1 and because of that reduction, they had to change how  
2 they structured their security.

3 But the security that they do have is at the  
4 same level and ensures high assurance that -- that the  
5 material will be protected.

6 One thing I mentioned earlier, that we at  
7 headquarters, we review the security plans. All  
8 licensees, including SONGS, have four security plans  
9 that they have to maintain:

10 There's a physical security plan, which  
11 basically goes over the physical measures that the  
12 plant has to maintain; there is a training and  
13 qualification plan, which basically goes over what all  
14 the requirements are for all the security personnel,  
15 and there's the safeguards contingency plan, which  
16 basically the plant has to go through several different  
17 scenarios and make sure that they cover a lot of the  
18 various levels of scenarios and how they're going to do  
19 that, and so they have to provide that to us;

20 And then we also have a cyber security plan,  
21 which -- which goes over the, you know, the digital  
22 assess as far as making sure that they are not  
23 vulnerable to cyber attacks.

24 Our regulations are very prescriptive. They  
25 do specifically tell the things that must be required

1 in these plans and we check those, and we also make  
2 sure that we check when they make a change, such as the  
3 changes they made for the decommissioning, that they  
4 still maintain their same level of -- level of  
5 protection that they have.

6 Oh, and also just to kind of note, there is  
7 also plans for the independent spent fuel storage  
8 installation also, so they do have to also maintain  
9 certain requirements for the -- for the spent fuel  
10 that's being stored.

11 So with that, I'm going to turn it over to  
12 Mark Haire, who works with our regional office in  
13 Region 4.

14 MR. HAIRE: Okay. Thanks, Duane.

15 I just wanted to give a quick perspective. My  
16 name is Mark Haire. As Duane said, I work for the  
17 Nuclear Regulatory Commission. I work out of one of  
18 our four regional offices that Duane mentioned where  
19 the inspection effort occurs.

20 I work in the Region 4 Office, which is in  
21 Arlington, Texas, which is Dallas/Forthworth area, a  
22 great place to live. And we cover, basically,  
23 everything west of the Mississippi, so that includes  
24 the California plants as well.

25 So I thought it would be interesting to just

1 share with you quickly what kinds of things that we  
2 inspect and how -- how much inspection effort actually  
3 goes on at a power plant and who is doing those  
4 inspections, so I just wanted to quickly give you that  
5 perspective.

6 First of all, what -- what gets inspected:

7 There are really 12 inspectable areas in the  
8 security realm that our inspectors look at and I'll  
9 just give you a quick summary of what those 12 areas  
10 are; they're all related, obviously, with ensuring that  
11 the utility complies with the requirement to provide  
12 high assurance that they can defend against the  
13 design-basis threat and protect the public health and  
14 safety. And so we -- we independently inspect their  
15 efforts to comply with those requirements.

16 So, areas that we look at:

17 We look at how they authorize who can have  
18 access to the site, access authorization. We also look  
19 at their access control, how do they physically control  
20 who can get into the site and how they gain access to  
21 the site. So there is only certain ways you can access  
22 the site: You have to have credentials, there are  
23 biometric scans to ensure you are who your credential  
24 say you are; there is -- there is a significant amount  
25 of control over who and how they get into the site. So

1 those are two areas that we inspect.

2 Then we have a significant inspection program  
3 ran out of our headquarter's office called the  
4 "Force-on-Force Inspection Program." It's a huge  
5 inspection effort and it is kind of just what it sounds  
6 like. It's -- we bring a mock adversary force and we  
7 challenge their security officers to implement their  
8 strategy and prove that they can protect the plant  
9 against the design-basis threat.

10 And I use that phrase, design-basis threat,  
11 maybe -- maybe that phrase is not familiar to you. Any  
12 time you are -- you know, in security philosophy, any  
13 time you want to secure something and protect it, you  
14 need to define -- to some degree, define what it is  
15 you're protecting against.

16 Are we protecting it against the Iraqi army  
17 from attacking the California Coast? We're not --  
18 we're not asking utilities to protect the power plants  
19 against a national army, but we are asking them to  
20 protect against what we consider a reasonable threat  
21 based on our intelligence's assessment of what kind of  
22 threats there are in the world that are doing terrorist  
23 activities that could be a threat at a power plant.

24 So we're informed by the things that are going  
25 on around the world, terrorist attacks, probing

1 attacks, things that have been forwarded, things that  
2 have been successful around the world, so we define  
3 that threat.

4 And as Ross mentioned, we can't talk about  
5 what those definitions are very well in public, that's  
6 secured information. But we do define the threat, we  
7 do test their ability in performance space to defend  
8 against that threat during a force-on-force exercise.  
9 We do those every three years.

10 They're required to do force-on-force  
11 exercises at the site every year and we inspect those  
12 as well. We look at their equipment, their equipment  
13 maintenance and testing, and that's everything from  
14 their intrusion detection system, their cameras, all  
15 the way down to the radios that the security officers  
16 use and, of course, the weapons.

17 All those things need to be deliberately  
18 maintained and periodically tested to ensure that they  
19 function and we inspect to make sure that those things  
20 are carried out properly, so that's equipment.

21 We look at their protective strategy, which is  
22 another way of saying how they design their protection,  
23 do they understand their fields of fire, what things  
24 they're trying to protect, where they're placing their  
25 officers so that they can interdict an adversary

1 attacking from any direction or multiple directions.

2 So have they designed their strategy  
3 effectively and have they accounted for as many  
4 variables as they can, for instance, the time line it  
5 takes for an officer to run down a flight of stairs and  
6 get in position when the attack is coming from a  
7 direction that he wasn't previously positioned for, so  
8 all of those things are factored into their protective  
9 strategy and we evaluate and test that as well.

10 We look at their safeguards controls program  
11 and that's kind of what Ross was alluding to. We look  
12 at how they control the security-related information  
13 that they're not allowed to divulge to the public.  
14 They've got to have significant control on that  
15 information, how it's stored, how it's handled, who can  
16 look at it. And so we'll be watching you, Ross, as you  
17 present to make sure that you stay within those bounds.  
18 And I'll check that off for my inspection.

19 We also look at their training. There is a  
20 significant amount of training required for security  
21 officers, so we inspect what they do on their tactical  
22 course, on their course of fire for their weapons  
23 handling, for their use of force training -- all the  
24 different things that the security officers are  
25 required to be able to do they have to be trained on

1 effectively and we look at that in an inspection  
2 effort.

3 We look at their Fitness for Duty -- Fitness  
4 for Duty Program and that phrase may mean different  
5 things for different people. If they have a military  
6 background, it may mean one thing to you.

7 What we mean by "fitness for duty" is that  
8 every person who shows up at the site needs to be not  
9 impaired in any way, by chemicals or by fatigue or by  
10 emotions, so they have to have a program where they  
11 systematically evaluate and test their employees  
12 fitness both before they hire them and then randomly  
13 throughout their career, as they work. So that's a  
14 significant program that we do fairly substantive  
15 inspection on.

16 There is another inspection called the  
17 Material Control and Accounting System, which it may  
18 not sound like much of a security program, it is -- it  
19 is simply how they track and maintain control of and  
20 custody of all of the special nuclear material that  
21 they're required to protect, so they have to account  
22 for every gram of radioactive material, specially  
23 nuclear material, that they have custody of.

24 And so they have to have records, they have to  
25 have transfer records, they have to know where it's

1 stored, and we inspect that as well.

2 So that is 9 of the 12 areas I was going to  
3 mention. So, quickly three more: We look at their  
4 target sets. They have to maintain a list of target  
5 sets and that is the elements that they know are most  
6 attractive to an adversary that would do the most  
7 damage to the site, create the most threat to the  
8 public.

9 Those are -- are identified and their strategy  
10 is built around protecting those, so we have to inspect  
11 to make sure that they properly identify those and that  
12 as changes occur throughout the life of the plant, that  
13 they continue to update that list so that we know we're  
14 protecting -- they're protecting the right thing.

15 We have a Cyber Security Inspection Program,  
16 so it's kind of those things that's evolving, all the  
17 corporations in the United States have to deal with  
18 this. It's a significant issue that we need to deal  
19 with and inspect here in the nuclear area.

20 They've got to be able to protect their  
21 digital assets and they've got to protect them against  
22 potential attack vectors from the digital world, so air  
23 gaps and isolation and things like that, we inspect  
24 that area.

25 And then the last thing that I'll mention that

1 we inspect is their performance indicators and that's a  
2 regulatory term. We require every licensee to report  
3 certain statistical data to us on a periodic basis, and  
4 when we come out to inspect, we always try to verify,  
5 not try to, we do verify that they have properly  
6 reported that information to us by checking the data --  
7 data when we're on site.

8 So those are the 12 areas that we inspect,  
9 that's what we inspect in the security realm and, of  
10 course, we have other safety and other areas of  
11 inspection, but that's the security area, that's what I  
12 focus on in my position.

13 I don't think I've described what my position  
14 is. I work in the regional office. I'm a branch  
15 chief, I'm a manager, and the folks who work for me are  
16 security inspectors, that's why I'm up here on the  
17 panel for this security topic. So I have eight guys  
18 that work for me that do security inspections.

19 How much inspection effort do we provide? I  
20 don't know if this would mean much to you, but we -- I  
21 did the average and we, as a requirement for our  
22 baseline inspection program, we spend about 313.5 hours  
23 of direct inspection at a power plant every year and we  
24 do that with inspections that are required annually,  
25 some of our inspections are required every two years,

1 some of our inspections are required every three years.  
2 But that's direct inspection hours on site, 313.5.

3 And then we would have additional inspections  
4 when we identify issues that need to be followed up or  
5 events that need to be followed up on. And, as Duane  
6 said, we've not relaxed any of those requirements for  
7 the decommissioning sites, so we continue to spend  
8 significant inspection hours to verify those programs  
9 for the decommissioning site, so that's how much  
10 inspection we spend at a power plant.

11 And then a quick statement about who is doing  
12 the inspection: I said I have eight inspectors that  
13 work for me. Each of those guys have significant  
14 background and significant training before they come to  
15 the agency and then we provide them about a year and a  
16 half to two years of training on the job in order to  
17 prepare them to do these inspections.

18 What kind of background do they bring? All of  
19 my guys bring either a law enforcement background or a  
20 military security kind of background, and I'll tell you  
21 that I have three ex-Marines that work for me.

22 Although, some people say you're never an ex-Marine,  
23 you're always a Marine. Right?

24 But I have three guys that had Marine service,  
25 Marine Corps. service that work for me, I have two guys

1 that were ex-Air Force security specialist, I have one  
2 ex-Army security specialist that's working for me, I  
3 have one guy that -- that did not bring a specific  
4 security background to my group, but he brought an  
5 engineering background to my group and then cross  
6 trained and he brings a different perspective as he  
7 looks at the equipment, the safety security interface  
8 aspect of that. He's very valuable to my team.

9 And then the most recent member of my team  
10 that I just added is a Navy SEAL, and so we have a  
11 very, very diverse but experienced group of guys that  
12 understand how to protect assets and how to find  
13 vulnerabilities in the protection system for assets and  
14 that's what we try to do, make an independent  
15 assessment, that the licensees are actually following  
16 our requirements.

17 So that was probably a longer-winded answer  
18 that I intended, but I think I'm done. And, Ross, I've  
19 got my eyes on you.

20 MR. QUAM: Okay.

21 MR. HAIRE: Go ahead.

22 MR. QUAM. Thank you. You pretty much covered my  
23 entire presentation. So I'll go into -- there'll be  
24 some repeating of what Mark has covered and then we'll  
25 go into some site specific details on what we do

1 specifically at San Onofre.

2           Next slide. Let's see. So, overview of what  
3 I'll cover: I'll cover our mission at SONGS and what  
4 our objectives are, I'll cover adversary  
5 characteristic, though not all of them, we'll go over  
6 our security plans, our licensing documents, and our  
7 security procedures, we'll cover the inside of  
8 mitigation program and the local law enforcement agency  
9 support.

10           Next slide. As our mission, it's to protect  
11 the health and safety of the public against the threat  
12 of radiological sabotage. How we do that -- we have  
13 well-trained, highly-qualified, armed security force.  
14 Just like marked talked about, most of our officers, if  
15 not all -- actually, all of them, have a military or  
16 law enforcement background; probably, 90 percent former  
17 Marine, then the rest are made up with Army, Air Force,  
18 local law enforcement, et cetera.

19           We have a state-of-the-art intrusion detection  
20 system and cameras so we can detect and assess any  
21 attempted entry into the early warning zone or  
22 protected areas and then meet that attempted breach  
23 with the appropriate use of force.

24           We use that -- we implement our use of force  
25 from hardened defensive positions. Most of those

1 positions, actually, all of them on the perimeter, are  
2 elevated positions that provide officers with both  
3 bullet resistance and glass protection.

4           Next slide. The objective and requirements,  
5 these are outlined by 10CFR 7355. Physical protection  
6 program has to be designed to address the design-basis  
7 threat of radiological sabotage. We have to maintain  
8 the capability to detect, assess, and interdict and  
9 neutralize threats, and the program has to demonstrate  
10 effective implementation of the protective strategies,  
11 so that's our drill and exercise program, which  
12 includes the force-on-force exercises and integrated  
13 exercises. We have our emergency preparedness group  
14 and outside law enforcement agencies.

15           Next slide. So, Radiological Sabotage and  
16 Theft: Theft isn't something we deal with at this  
17 level because just getting into the plant is going to  
18 be hard enough let alone trying to make it out while  
19 you're carrying something.

20           So, really, we're dealing with sabotage,  
21 deliberate acts that could endanger the public with  
22 exposure to radiation. Usually, that's going to be  
23 going into the plant and blowing things up. The threat  
24 is a determined violent external assault, attack by  
25 stealth, or deceptive actions, including diversion

1 reaction by an adversary force.

2 It could be a single group attacking through  
3 one entry point, it could be multiple groups attacking  
4 through multiple entry points.

5 Next slide. This group of attackers is well  
6 trained, dedicated individuals with sufficient  
7 knowledge to identify specific equipment or locations  
8 necessary for a successful attack. They also might be  
9 using active or a passive insider, somebody that works  
10 at the plant, has access to the plant.

11 They have suitable weapons to accomplish  
12 admission, again, weapons, explosive. They also  
13 hand-carried equipment: Ladders, ropes, other tools,  
14 breaching equipment. They also may have a land- or  
15 water-borne vehicle assault. That would be a blast  
16 attack scenario. They also might do a cyber attack.

17 Next slide. Our security plans. These are  
18 our licensing documents. Kind of what Mark talked  
19 about, we have a physical security plan, safeguards  
20 contingency plan, training and qualification plan, and  
21 cyber security plan.

22 We have all those plans that have roles and  
23 responsibilities, chain of command, compensatory  
24 requirements, that's what we've know -- known as Plan  
25 B, right, if something fails, what do we do to

1       compensate for that until we can get the failed  
2       equipment to work, whatever it is, repaired?

3               We have a Training and Qualification Plan,  
4       that also includes our annual drills and exercises. So  
5       officers need to perform, they need to go to the range,  
6       they have to qualify with each weapon that they use;  
7       they need to do physical fitness testing, demonstrate  
8       their ability to perform actions in accordance with our  
9       protective strategy.

10              Then we have a pre-determined response plan of  
11       strategies for 21 different events that could happen  
12       and then on top of that there's other events that  
13       aren't covered and we have a plan for those events as  
14       well that I can't talk about.

15              All right. Next slide. Our procedures go  
16       into more detail on specifically how the site  
17       implements those plans, such as equipment and  
18       maintenance and testing program, training and  
19       qualification plan, how often we go to the range, how  
20       often we do drills and exercises, what officers need to  
21       do to demonstrate their critical task performance on an  
22       annual basis and sometimes more often, cover search  
23       requirement, post responsibility and our tactical  
24       response procedures.

25              So each officer in the physical security

1 plant -- in the security plan knows what their post  
2 responsibilities are if there was an attack.

3 And, generally speaking, I'm not going to say  
4 our timelines, Mark or Duane, but generally speaking,  
5 this is a matter of seconds that the officers are ready  
6 to respond. So if there's an alarm on the fence, the  
7 perimeter early warning zone, it's a matter of seconds  
8 that they have their weapon in hand, ready to engage in  
9 adversary threat.

10 Next slide. Protection of Plans. Again, all  
11 plans are protected under the safeguard information  
12 under 10CFR 73.21, and that's the physical security  
13 plan, training and qualification plan, safeguard  
14 contingency plan, cyber security plan, and some of our  
15 implementing procedures are also safeguards  
16 information.

17 Next slide. So, Defense in Depth. Duane  
18 talked a little bit or Mark talked a little bit about  
19 what we do as a -- you know, we're not protecting  
20 against an Iraqi army, but what we do have is, it  
21 starts with the owner controlled area. This is our  
22 defense in depth.

23 The owner controlled area is controlled with  
24 gates, armed security officers, fences, et cetera. But  
25 we know that could have holes in it, so we keep going

1 to the next level.

2 Early Warning System. This early warning  
3 system doesn't have holes in it. If you try to  
4 penetrate the early warning system, we will know about  
5 it and there will be an armed response. Between the  
6 early warning system and the protected area, there's a  
7 significant amount of delay features, things like  
8 razor-wired fencing, et cetera.

9 After that, you get to the protected area,  
10 again, intrusion detection, video capture, assessment  
11 capabilities, and armed response and, also, additional  
12 delay at the protected area. Then we have Vital Area  
13 of Protection. So, inside the protected area, we have  
14 vital areas protected by steel doors, concrete walls,  
15 structures, et cetera, other delay features, again, and  
16 armed response. And inside the vital areas we have the  
17 targets and components or the target sets.

18 Next slide. So this is the owner-controlled  
19 area. It goes all the way around the entire plant here  
20 and this area is patrolled 24/7, either on foot,  
21 vehicles, video capabilities, and then inside further  
22 you get into early warning, protected area fence, vital  
23 area, et cetera.

24 Next slide, so this is the OCA access. You  
25 can see the gates. We have armed security out there.

1 We have various barriers in the OCA, vehicle barrier  
2 system, active and passive vehicle barrier system,  
3 closed-circuit TV monitoring and roving patrols.

4 Next slide. Hardened Defensive Positions.  
5 Again, elevated fighting positions for the security  
6 officers, it gives them a tactical advantage, also,  
7 bullet resistance and blast resistance.

8 Next slide. Again, Vehicle Barrier System.  
9 This one in particular is specifically for the  
10 independent spent fuel storage installation, ISFSI. So  
11 on the other side of this is where we store our spent  
12 fuel. That vehicle barrier system, again, goes all the  
13 way around the entire area to prevent any vehicles from  
14 getting within the minimum safe stand-out distance for  
15 the target.

16 Next slide. U.S. 2-3 Protected Area. This is  
17 where currently our reactors are and spent fuel.  
18 Again, to get to this area, you're talking about going  
19 through the OCA, getting through the Early Warning  
20 System, protect -- going through the Delayed Protected  
21 Area, more delay, to get inside this area.

22 And, again, the entire perimeter is covered  
23 with hardened defensive positions, elevated positions,  
24 that can maintain overlapping, interlocking fields of  
25 fire on every piece of that perimeter.

1           Next slide. Delay Fences. These are inside  
2 the protected area, so if somebody was to magically get  
3 past the protected area fence, they're going to run  
4 into more delay features and on the inside more  
5 security officer, fallback locations, et cetera, that  
6 would meet the adversaries before they could get to a  
7 target set location.

8           Next slide. Vital Area Protection. Concrete  
9 floors, walls, ceilings, steel locked doors that are  
10 also alarmed, they require key -- key card access,  
11 additional delay barriers, and anti-grenade or  
12 explosive screens. So in this picture here, if you're  
13 looking from the point of view, from the security  
14 officer, from a protected position, and these red doors  
15 came from the outside, if you come through those doors,  
16 you're going to be facing armed security response.

17           If you decide to open the door and throw a  
18 grenade, guess what's going to happen, it's going to  
19 hit these delay -- these grenade screens, it's not  
20 going to impact the officer; if you come through the  
21 door, you're going to be met with appropriate use of  
22 force.

23           We also have defensive channeling and  
24 man-traps. This is where we drive adversaries to  
25 certain location to trap them so we can respond to that

1 location and meet them with the appropriate use of  
2 force.

3 Next slide. Security Monitoring Systems,  
4 there are at least two security monitoring systems at  
5 the plant, those monitor the Early Warning Zones  
6 protected areas, vital area alarms, they have the  
7 capability to detect and assess remotely any alarms on  
8 protected areas, vital areas, or early warning.

9 They have video playback so they can see what  
10 happened. If we get an alarm on a fence somewhere,  
11 they can play that back and see what caused that alarm.  
12 So if somebody came up to the fence and put an  
13 explosive to breach it or started cutting it, they  
14 would see that happening, they would know is a --  
15 that's an attack on the plant and we would implement  
16 the response plan.

17 We have multiple methods of communicating from  
18 the central alarm station and secondary alarm stations,  
19 those include communicating with the on-site security  
20 force and communicating with outside agencies.

21 (Locked conference door forcefully shakes.)

22 MR. QUAM: We're attempting to be breached at this  
23 moment. (Member of public enters conference room.)

24 All right. Next slide. So we talked about  
25 the inside, the adversaries may be aided by active or

1 passive insider. So we have Insider Mitigation Program  
2 and we are aware that this is a mitigation program,  
3 it's not an insider prevention program, so there are  
4 other measures we take in the event that we have an  
5 insider.

6 So we have Access Authorization Program: We  
7 check the backgrounds and the qualifications of  
8 personnel that request access to the plant. Fitness  
9 for Duty Program that includes the continuous behavior  
10 observation program with supervisors that are trained  
11 to identify any signs of changes in behavior and they  
12 have to report out on that and approve that person each  
13 day -- each 30-day period to maintain their access to  
14 the plant.

15 They also have to be free from drugs and  
16 alcohol. There's random testing, there's post-event  
17 testing, four concepts testing, and, of course,  
18 pre-hire screening. And also it has to contain the  
19 elements of the physical protection program, meaning  
20 that we patrol all areas of the plant, vital areas,  
21 protected areas, owner-controlled areas, and look for  
22 any unauthorized activity, anything that looks  
23 suspicious, and the officers are trained and qualified  
24 to look for those types of activities that may be an  
25 indication that we have an insider activity going on.

1           And, of course, all the personnel that enter  
2 the plant receive a complete search regardless even if  
3 it's an armed security officer showing up for shift;  
4 they need to be searched for all contraband, weapons,  
5 explosives, et cetera, prior to entering the plant.

6           Next slide. We have integrated law  
7 Enforcement Agency Support. So our primary law  
8 enforcement agency is the Federal Bureau of  
9 Investigation, FBI, primarily because we are located on  
10 Camp Pendleton and that is federal property.

11           The FBI maintains a SONGS integrated law  
12 enforcement response plan, which outlines response  
13 actions for all agencies listed: Cost Guard, FAA,  
14 Border Patrol, State Park, Highway Patrol, Orange  
15 County Sheriff, San Diego County Sheriff, and USMC  
16 Provost Marshal's office.

17           Next slide. With all these agencies listed  
18 here, FBI, Highway Patrol, Marine Corps., State Parks,  
19 and Border Patrol, we have multiple methods of  
20 communicating with them. They have our radios. We do  
21 contacts with them on a "shiftly" basis in some cases,  
22 in some cases on a monthly basis to make sure our  
23 communication systems are operable.

24           All right. Next slide. Is there questions,  
25 comments?

1           CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay. Thank you very much to all  
2 the presenters. Let me see -- I've got some questions,  
3 but I want to see if other members of the CEP want to  
4 begin. Tim Brown?

5           MR. BROWN. Do you want to do your thing where you  
6 turn the card upside down?

7           CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Efficient.

8           MR. BROWN: Yes, it's very efficient.

9           CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Particularly, overrated, but you  
10 know --

11          MR. BROWN: It can be. My question is more  
12 pertaining to the insider mitigation slide that you  
13 had. This is particular relevant to me because we saw  
14 recently that a Lufthansa pilot, who was a very  
15 determined, very intelligent, very disturbed  
16 individual, was able to use the only security protocol  
17 that had been put in place to actually sabotage and  
18 override the systems and crash into the Italian Alps, I  
19 believe, and did a tremendous amount of damage. I'm  
20 glad that you covered this because that was one of the  
21 questions I had.

22                   The second question I had was systems defense,  
23 for example, if they take an action to, say, drain the  
24 pool, to program it so that it would do that, similar  
25 to what the pilot did, where he was able to guide the

1 plane into the mountain and override the safety system.

2 Do you oversee that as well, all of the system  
3 defenses or mechanisms, that will prevent an individual  
4 from having that power and authority? And is that in  
5 place current? And I just wanted you to chat a little  
6 bit about what systems are in place inside the plant  
7 that would prevent someone who had the know-how, who  
8 passed all the screening from doing damage?

9 MR. QUAM: So I'll give Tom the first shot and then  
10 I'll cover.

11 MR. PALMISANO: Okay. So, in general terms, as  
12 Ross said, our people, who have access to the plant,  
13 particularly inside the protected areas and vital  
14 areas, that's where the sensitive equipment is. Okay?

15 So not every employee who works at the site  
16 has access to the protected area or fewer even have  
17 access to vital areas. So, first of all, you have a  
18 need to be there.

19 Secondly, every body pre-hired and post-hired  
20 subject to drug, alcohol screening and we, through this  
21 Behavioral Observation Program, we look for signs of  
22 behavior that would tell us that somebody is under  
23 duress, whether it's an emotional issue in their  
24 personal life or work issue, to see if we're seeing  
25 early signs of somebody's behavior that would concern

1 us. Okay?

2 And, you know, the reactors are out of service  
3 so, quite frankly, a lot of equipment that we used to  
4 worry about are not in play anymore, it's largely the  
5 spent fuel pool. You know, we have multiple people on  
6 duty in the plant in the control room elsewhere, you  
7 know, with the people highly screened and trustworthy  
8 and observed for trustworthiness. We mitigate a lot of  
9 the risk that way.

10 We have other people who are watching for how  
11 systems are operating and responding to see if  
12 something doesn't appear normal that other people could  
13 then step in. As well as, Ross alluded to, cyber  
14 security, which are serious requirements for a lot of  
15 the industry in this country, in particular electric  
16 utilities and nuclear plants.

17 Again, most of our systems are pretty isolated  
18 from the outside world in decommissioning fewer systems  
19 are susceptible. So that high level answer, Ross, what  
20 would you add?

21 MR. QUAM: What I would add is that there are  
22 methods that people who work at the plant and security  
23 understand for, say, draining the spent fuel pool.  
24 There are monitoring systems in place to know if the  
25 fuel level starts to decrease; security would be

1 notified and we have response actions and emergency  
2 plans for that -- for that action.

3           If we were to lose that capability, to  
4 remotely monitor spent fuel level temperature,  
5 et cetera, things that I can't go into a lot of detail  
6 about, if for some reason we lost that ability, we have  
7 additional security patrol who are put in place to  
8 ensure that people don't go to the systems or  
9 manipulate components that could drain the pool.

10           MR. PALMISANO: So these are the types of things  
11 that are thought out ahead of time and predefined plans  
12 if something does not appear to be responding or acting  
13 normally between operations and security actions would  
14 be taken.

15           MR. QUAM: Correct.

16           CHAIRMAN VICTOR: And at this moment, the spent  
17 fuel pool is presumably the central focus.

18           MR. PALMISANO: Yes, as, I think, Mark and Duane  
19 alluded, as you go to decommissioning, our security  
20 requirements have not changed, our security plans to  
21 protect the required systems to the same level, we've  
22 asked for no exemptions for security, but there are  
23 fewer target sets, if you will, that have to be  
24 defended because the reactors and a lot of the  
25 associated equipment is no longer in service.

1 MR. QUAM: And then one other thing, personnel that  
2 has unique knowledge of, say, security plans and plant  
3 operations also have another level of requirement; they  
4 need to be in the critical group and they get more  
5 frequent background investigation, the psychological  
6 evaluation than the standard employee.

7 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay. Great. Thank you. And  
8 Mark and Duane, do you agree? It looks like you guys  
9 agree with that. So, Pam Patterson is next.

10 MS. PATTERSON: So my question is along those  
11 lines. I was wondering what is sort of your "World  
12 Trade Center" plan when somebody is driving in a 747 to  
13 hit San Onofre. What's your -- what's your solution to  
14 that?

15 MR. QUAM: So, do you want to cover that one or I  
16 can cover it?

17 MR. PALMISANO: Well, you start Ross and then I'll  
18 throw in a broader picture with mitigating strategies  
19 and other actions.

20 MR. QUAM: Okay. So if -- if we did have a  
21 situation where we had a plane headed in and we knew  
22 about it, the FBI knew about it, there are capabilities  
23 to get air support from the Marine Corp. base, the FBI  
24 will do that through the DOD.

25 If there is some threat that there may be an

1 attack, the FBI then will go through Homeland Security,  
2 et cetera, to look at the potential for patrolling the  
3 air space, because it is Camp Pendleton air space.

4 And then ultimately if a plane did arrive at  
5 the site and did crash into the building, most likely,  
6 it wouldn't cause spent fuel sabotage, it wouldn't  
7 result on that. And then we have mitigating strategies  
8 in place to deal with the large area lost to fire or  
9 explosion.

10 MR. PALMISANO: Yeah. So let me pick up from  
11 there. We also ought to mention the FAA has some  
12 requirements to notify, starting with Homeland  
13 Security, the FBI, and the NRC, if there is an aircraft  
14 that appears to be a threat to a nuclear plant and we  
15 are notified and we have some actions if we're notified  
16 there's an airplane, potentially incoming, 60 minutes  
17 out, 30 minutes out, there are some things we do at the  
18 plant to disperse people and other things, and I can't  
19 go in any more detail, to prepare for the worse  
20 outcome.

21 Post -- this is really post-9/11, a lot -- a  
22 lot of analysis was done by the NRC and a lot of  
23 changes made in the industry to look at the  
24 vulnerability of nuclear plants to aircraft impact, in  
25 particularly large fires, due to aircraft impact, to

1 look at how hardened is equipment.

2 The good news is, containment buildings, spent  
3 fuel pool buildings, particularly in San Onofre,  
4 because ours is very robust because the seismic  
5 requirements, are pretty hardened against that. But we  
6 all put in place what are called today "mitigating  
7 strategies," which is part of our -- our license that  
8 we maintain with the ability to have diverse equipment  
9 away from an area that would be impacted that we could  
10 bring in and mobilize, in our case, to provide water  
11 and cool the spent fuel pool.

12 So there is a layer of defense, starting with  
13 early warning, how we would disperse people to survive  
14 an attack and how we have equipment staged away from  
15 the specific equipment that could be impacted that  
16 would be brought in to mitigate the damage and prevent  
17 a radiological release. So there's a whole layer of  
18 activities that have been thought through since 9/11.

19 MS. PATTERSON: Okay. But you understand that this  
20 is an ultra-hazardous activity, slash, condition that  
21 you've created there and so, obviously, there is -- I  
22 mean, the law is, it's all about strict liability in  
23 that case.

24 Now, obviously, we're not really interested in  
25 the outcome of a lawsuit after something happens, so

1 what we're concerned about is the fact that you're  
2 prepared ahead of time. And so, obviously, we've got  
3 multiple airports around here, John Wayne, being --  
4 what? -- less than 40 minutes away.

5 So, to me, it seems like you should have  
6 drills where you already have the plan in place where  
7 if -- if an airplane comes into the air space where  
8 there shouldn't -- you know, you should be watching for  
9 it every second of the day.

10 And if an airplane is coming in, you've got --  
11 you're going to shoot it down. So I don't really --  
12 that doesn't really sound like that's set up. And so  
13 that's, obviously, a big fault. Because, obviously, we  
14 know that this is a tactic that has been used, not just  
15 at the World Trade Center but, you know, we saw  
16 recently where that occurred.

17 Okay. So San Onofre has been on notice for  
18 years that the terrorist have actually stated there  
19 was, you know, people testifying in front of Congress  
20 that the terrorist said target the power plants. So  
21 and like the guy on this slide 12, I'm not really  
22 feeling confident that this guy is the guy that is  
23 going to be like some suicide guy, terrorist comes  
24 rolling in that he's going to be able to do anything.

25 He looks like he's about, at least, 40 pounds

1 overweight. I can't really tell what color his hair  
2 is, but he doesn't look like he's in any kind of  
3 condition to, you know, combat a bunch terrorists.

4 So I'm just not feeling confident with respect  
5 to, No. 1, the threat with some jet coming in. It  
6 would be disastrous. Okay? We can't afford that. And  
7 so, quite frankly -- I mean, I came to one of these  
8 meetings back, I think, in 2003 and I've pretty much  
9 said the same thing, that it's not properly secured.

10 And so I really feel like you're  
11 underestimating the risk, and since it is an  
12 ultrahazardous condition that you've got, that you've  
13 created there, you don't have -- you can't -- you can't  
14 be lackadaisical about this. You've got to assume for  
15 the worst. And the worst, in my opinion, one that's  
16 absolutely predictable is the World Trade Center  
17 scenario.

18 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: So, why don't we put this in a --  
19 why don't we put the question with respect for what you  
20 can and can't say, Tom? Why don't we put the question  
21 back to you, then, about give us a little more detail  
22 about the kinds of scenarios that you're already ready  
23 for, the monitoring that's already going on.

24 MR. PALMISANO: Sure. So, you know, this gets, as  
25 the NRC representatives talked and Ross talked there,

1 the NRC mandates a design set of threats that we need  
2 to be able to detect and defend against.

3 And I appreciate the concern about an airplane  
4 impact. The nuclear plants are not equipped to shoot  
5 down an airplane, quite frankly, you know, that's not  
6 part of the defined threat, nor do I think we would  
7 want nuclear plants equipped to shoot down airplanes.

8 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay.

9 MS. PATTERSON: Well, you've got Camp Pendleton  
10 right there. Aren't they in the business of doing that  
11 sort of thing?

12 MR. PALMISANO: No, I can't really speak for Camp  
13 Pendleton's mission, that's -- that's not our role.  
14 What my point is, there is an integrated mechanism,  
15 starting with the FAA, to monitor air traffic to  
16 identify potential threats, to alert NRC, Homeland  
17 Security, FBI, and us, the licensee.

18 With respect to something like that, post-9/11  
19 we've all analyzed the plans and the NRC has done quite  
20 a bit of work to look at should an airplane attack a  
21 nuclear plant, what the damage scenarios are and how  
22 you mitigate a radiological release.

23 We are prepared for that, we do practice and  
24 train on that, we test the equipment, we test the  
25 people, we have to train on that and the NRC inspects

1 that. So I don't want to leave you with the impression  
2 that we're not ready, we don't have procedures and  
3 plans.

4 We do not engage and shoot down a commercial  
5 aircraft, quite frankly, but within the threats that  
6 Ross -- Ross talked about, where we interdict --  
7 interdict and neutralize, we do defend against certain  
8 threats and incoming aircraft miles away is not one of  
9 them.

10 MR. QUAM: Can I just address one of those?

11 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Very briefly. Then I do want to  
12 make sure we get other comments.

13 MR. QUAM: Got it. So the guy in the picture  
14 there, there are some security officers that are  
15 overweight. This one in particular probably has a  
16 vest, with a lot of bullets on it. Also, this guy is  
17 not in a foot race with anybody. This person will let  
18 people know that a truck is coming, a vehicle is  
19 coming, blew passes his checkpoint or it's coming in  
20 too fast and, ultimately, there's hardened barriers  
21 that that truck is going to run into. Then you got the  
22 fence, early warnings, the multiple posts that are  
23 going to engage.

24 MS. PATTERSON: Yeah, I really like this thing  
25 that -- what? -- they're going to call in, "Hey,

1 there's an airplane coming your way. Guys get ready."  
2 And then the guy at the front gate that doesn't even --  
3 I can't even see a gun on him, is going to go "Oops."

4 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay.

5 MS. PATTERSON: "This big -- this group of  
6 terrorists just came in, so get ready," that doesn't --  
7 that's not, you know, making me feel very secured.

8 MEMBER OF PUBLIC: (Inaudible.)

9 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Can I just comment briefly on  
10 this? So there are a lot of different -- I think what  
11 we're focusing on right now are the arrangements around  
12 the plant and we need to ask all these questions and we  
13 need to get answers to these questions.

14 There's also been an exchange where Bill  
15 Parker and I were involved with a member of the  
16 community about aircraft or other threats against  
17 nuclear plants and maybe we could, with your  
18 permission, Bill, we could make that email exchange a  
19 matter of public record. If that would be okay with  
20 you? I want to say something else about aircrafts.

21 MR. PARKER: If I may, let me pose the question  
22 direction to Tom: You do not have on-site defenses  
23 against an aircraft that delivers a suicide pilot  
24 onboard, so let's assume that a commercial aircraft  
25 fully loaded with fuel does impact the fuel storage

1 pool, you can't stop that, at least Southern California  
2 Edison can't stop that. But let's assume that it does  
3 impact, what do you do? What is your anticipated  
4 scenario for release of radioactive material?

5 MR. PALMISANO: So, what we do to respond to that,  
6 again, worse-case scenario, a large aircraft, with a  
7 lot of fuel impacts the facility, there's going to be  
8 significant damage, significant loss of life, we have  
9 people in dispersed areas --

10 MR. PARKER: But my question had to do with the  
11 release of radiological materials. Of course, any  
12 local workers would die. But I think the issue is more  
13 of a regional disaster where spent fuel would be vented  
14 into the atmosphere by a collapsed pool.

15 MR. PALMISANO: Yeah, the nature of the San Onofre  
16 buildings are very -- you know, because of the design  
17 of San Onofre and the seismic design and the amount of  
18 concrete, these plants in San Onofre have more robust  
19 spent fuel pools, say, than some older nuclear plants  
20 elsewhere in the country. If you've visited other  
21 plants, you'd somewhat be aware of what I'm talking  
22 about.

23 These are highly resistant to an impact, a  
24 fire would be a scenario which would be a challenge, so  
25 I don't anticipate an initial breach of a fuel pool,

1 it's more mitigating the fire, which is where the  
2 diverse equipment we have staged, the people that would  
3 man it, and the response from Camp Pendleton's fire  
4 department to extinguish the fire to prevent a  
5 significant release of radioactivity.

6 MR. PARKER: That is, I think, the issue you need  
7 to be specifically clear about.

8 MR. PALMISANO: Right.

9 MR. PARKER: That it's not the physical damage  
10 immediately to the structure, it's the subsequent fire  
11 and degradation of safety systems that you have to  
12 mitigate.

13 MR. PALMISANO: Right. Right. And the pool itself  
14 does not need much in the way of safety systems. You  
15 know, as cool as the fuel is, if I turned off all  
16 cooling today, it has many hours before it even heats  
17 up from 70 degrees to 200 degrees, as an example. And,  
18 you know, the issue is responding to a large fire with  
19 our equipment, with Pendleton's response and other  
20 off-site response.

21 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay. Let me make a suggestion,  
22 that we pull together, in a compact way, the material  
23 that can be released on this issue, including the  
24 material that would be relevant to the same scenario as  
25 relates to ISFSI because then, once the fuel is out of

1 the pool, then we've got the issue of ISFSI. So, why  
2 don't we take that on as something we ask Edison to put  
3 back in front of this panel?

4 We're running tight on time. I want to say  
5 one thing about aircraft, which is, it turns out --  
6 unrelated to this work that I'm doing as a volunteer --  
7 I'm a pilot and a certified airline transport pilot.

8 Since September 11, the piloting community has  
9 been forced to undergo a huge amount of training and  
10 including training on interdiction, and so the central  
11 line of defense in this scenario, I think it's very  
12 important that we ask the question, Bill's asked about  
13 what happens if all those lines of defense fail.

14 The central line of defense around aircraft  
15 danger is to intercept or divert away the aircraft  
16 before it gets to the facility; that's the central line  
17 of defense.

18 And we do not have cockpit procedures, like  
19 the Lufthansa procedures. We have never allowed single  
20 individuals in the cockpit on commercial aircraft, and  
21 so there's -- and there's a tremendous amount of  
22 interdiction that's going on, including aircraft  
23 either on high alert on the ground or in the air around  
24 sensitive facilities and restricted zones that create  
25 an extra buffer.

1           So, I think we need to respect that the folks  
2 at San Onofre are engaging with us on questions that  
3 relate to protection of the plant, which is their  
4 responsibility, and then there are these other, and  
5 maybe we should have a future meeting on this. There  
6 are a lot of things that probably can't be discussed,  
7 but a future meeting on the other layers of defense  
8 outside the jurisdiction of the NRC and the plant  
9 itself. Glenn Pascall, you had a question?

10           MR. PASCALL: A summary comment that I hope won't  
11 complicate the discussion. If I had been the first  
12 questioner, I would've asked about aerial attack. And  
13 as I listen to the presentation, the description of  
14 defense against ground attack was very persuasive, very  
15 robust.

16           There was only one mention of seaborne attack;  
17 that word appeared once, but without any reference to  
18 responses, and the only reference to airborne attack  
19 was a mention of the FAA being one of the participating  
20 partners.

21           And so I would just say, from a persuasive  
22 context, this is a presentation that's very persuasive  
23 on land-based attack and not persuasive on the other  
24 two because it barely touches on them, and I think the  
25 subsequent discussion has totally satisfied the

1 question I would've asked which is that you need to  
2 round out this presentation with as much specific  
3 detail within the security requirements of divulgence  
4 on those two forms of attack, is on the ground-based  
5 attack.

6 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Thank you ver much. I want to  
7 ask -- other questions? I wanted to just ask three  
8 questions very quickly. First question to Ross: You  
9 mentioned force-on-force or somebody is doing --

10 MR. QUAM: We both are doing force.

11 MR. WHITE: We both do.

12 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Everybody is doing  
13 force-on-force. What should we expect in terms of  
14 force-on-force drills and so on as we go through  
15 decommissioning? Because presumably at some point,  
16 it's not going to be as important for you to be sending  
17 guys dressed up like Ninja turtles to go pretend to  
18 attack the plant and see if they can get through.

19 MR. QUAM: So as long as there is fuel in the spent  
20 fuel pools, we will be running force-on-force drills.  
21 Every single officer will participate as a responder in  
22 a force-on-force exercise once per year and a drill  
23 every quarter, on top of that, whether that's a  
24 tabletop drill, a limited scope force-on-force,  
25 etcetera, they will have drill and exercise

1 participation, that's a total of five times each year  
2 for every single officer.

3 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay. And you guys agree with  
4 that?

5 MR. WHITE: I would just add that the -- what Ross  
6 said is true, the requirement for them to conduct their  
7 annual drills and their quarterly exercise --  
8 quarterly --

9 MR. QUAM: Drill.

10 MR. WHITE: I'm getting the words wrong --  
11 quarterly drills, annual exercises is not suspended  
12 until they transition out of decommissioning into an  
13 independent spent fuel storage installation, so that is  
14 true, and we will continue to inspect that on a  
15 periodic basis.

16 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Second question of the three I  
17 have is: I was asked a few weeks ago by somebody who  
18 is very heavily involved in the communities around  
19 Diablo Canyon about the support for local law  
20 enforcement, because they're very important  
21 relationships, as you said in your presentation, for  
22 local law enforcement and there are some moneys that  
23 flow to local involved law enforcement.

24 So I'm wondering maybe, Tom, you're going to  
25 cover this in your time line later, but can we get some

1 sense of what those relationships look like? Because  
2 what you're telling us is the picture where the risks  
3 go down, so presumably they're for the relationships,  
4 including the funding with local law enforcement,  
5 diminish with time as well.

6 What should we expect there? What do the  
7 communities think about that?

8 MR. QUAM: So I can't speak to the funding, perhaps  
9 Tom can. But as far as the relationships, on a least  
10 an annual basis, we have a "joint law enforcement  
11 response plan" meeting. We review the plans with all  
12 the agencies, make sure they're up-to-date, the  
13 communication systems are up-to-date, et cetera.

14 We do a walk-down of the plant, they look at  
15 our defenses. They're set even though, ultimately, law  
16 enforcement is going to come after the fact because if  
17 they come running in during the assault, they're going  
18 to be basically victims of our response strategies.

19 But we do go through the law enforcement  
20 response plan on an annual basis, and we have regular  
21 contact with State Parks, FBI, Highway Patrol, for  
22 various suspicious activities, the things that go on  
23 just on a routine nature. Tom?

24 MR. PALMISANO: And, David, with respect to  
25 funding, I think you're probably confused with Diablo

1 Canyon because you're probably talking about emergency  
2 plan funding as opposed to law enforcement funding. So  
3 emergency plan funding for California, currently, there  
4 is a law, and I won't get the right law number, but  
5 emergency plan funding by Diablo Canyon and San Onofre  
6 flows through the state, then to the local counties and  
7 agencies. That's a matter of law.

8 The law is in effect until mid-2019. We have  
9 very clearly said, and we've put a letter out to the  
10 Inter-Jurisdictional Planning Commission, we have no  
11 intent to petition for a change to that funding between  
12 now and 2019.

13 So, San Onofre will fund at its 100 percent  
14 level as if we had two operating reactors between now  
15 and 2019; that's important funding, our local -- local  
16 agencies provide excellent off-site response. We value  
17 that and appreciate that and we've made that  
18 commitment.

19 After 2019, we have also indicated a  
20 willingness to continue an appropriate level of  
21 funding. We will have both spent fuel pools emptied  
22 and be a dry cask only facility from a fuel standpoint,  
23 and that's really the radiological hazard at this point  
24 after 2019.

25 So the emergency plans will change, yet, again

1 at that point and then the off-site response needs will  
2 go down and we have said we will support an appropriate  
3 level of funding and we're engaged in the early  
4 dialogue to say what is that level of funding that the  
5 off-site agencies need and what's the right mechanism.  
6 So I think that's probably what you heard from the  
7 folks at Diablo Canyon.

8 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay. Thank you very much. I  
9 want to get the last couple of comments in here.

10 Jerry Kern? And then Dan Stetson.

11 MR. KERN: Tom touched -- kind of touched on  
12 something that says there's going to be a transition  
13 and so when they -- and I feel pretty comfortable right  
14 now about where the fuel is at, sitting in the pools  
15 inside the vessels. But I think there is a different  
16 set of vulnerabilities when you move it.

17 And so when they -- who designs or is that an  
18 NRC regulation when they talk about moving the fuel and  
19 what the security is and all the other things? Or is  
20 that site-specific? Or how does that work? I see  
21 somebody nodded over here (indicating).

22 Yeah, totally transition, once it's out in the  
23 open, you have a different set of vulnerabilities.

24 MR. HAIRE: Yeah, but the direct answer is yes,  
25 there are regulations that govern the movement of the

1 fuel and the transfer to the independent spent fuel  
2 storage facility and they'll be required to comply with  
3 those rules and we will be observing.

4 MR. PALMISANO: Yeah, and, you know, so just to  
5 reiterate, we're under the same security requirements  
6 that we had been as an operating plant and we will be  
7 until the spent fuel pools are emptied.

8 The target sets are different because the  
9 reactors are not in service and the NRC has  
10 requirements once the fuel is all in the ISFSI, the  
11 independent spent fuel installation.

12 We will have to propose a plan change, they  
13 will have to approve it before we implement it to make  
14 sure it is the appropriate level of security for the  
15 radiological risk.

16 A month ago I visited the Zion Plant, which is  
17 decommissioning north of Chicago, right on the shore of  
18 Lake Michigan, not seismically active but certainly a  
19 pretty high population density. They shut down in the  
20 late 90's. They've just recently off-loaded their fuel  
21 pools. They went into safe store for 15 years and now  
22 we -- we were there particularly looking at their  
23 security changes. But that's five years down the road  
24 for us, four or five years down the road.

25 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Dan Stetson, do you want --

1 MR. STETSON: Well, actually it was the same  
2 question relating to the security for transportation,  
3 so I think we covered that.

4 MR. PALMISANO: Well, and, you know, transportation  
5 on site is a rather short movement of the cask in a  
6 transportation overpack from the fuel pool to the  
7 ISFSI. We're not talking off-site transportation,  
8 that's the topic, once this paper is successful and we  
9 have an interim storage facility, we'll be talking  
10 about off-site transportation.

11 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Right. Okay. That would be for  
12 a future day. I just wanted to say one last thing,  
13 which is, next time we talk about these safety issues,  
14 I'd like us to get some feedback, and I don't quite  
15 know how to organize this, around this question of  
16 whether the system, as a whole -- and this is not a  
17 comment about San Onofre or Edison or the NRC --  
18 whether the system, as a whole, is doing a good job of  
19 imagining new threats.

20 My colleagues at the university, who study  
21 threats in war and so on, one of the things I've  
22 learned from them is that these systems are very good  
23 at fighting a last war and so they have design-basis  
24 requirements and so on that are all organized around  
25 threats that we've been actually seeing in the real

1 world, but then this whole process of imagining other  
2 things is really important.

3 And so I would love -- not now, but I'd love  
4 next time we work on this issue to maybe bring somebody  
5 in who is involved, either from the FBI side or the  
6 Intelligence Community, who's helping the system  
7 understand a larger picture of threats and how we are  
8 nimble in addressing those threats, because that might  
9 help us both, in the communities, understand that issue  
10 and maybe even contribute where we can.

11 Do you want to comment?

12 MR. WHITE: Could I -- could I make a quick comment  
13 on that "imagining potential future threats"? I would  
14 tell you that for the NRC training force-on-force  
15 exercise, we bring in our own -- it's a contract  
16 adversary force, and we bring in our own specialist  
17 from the Department of Defense, people who have special  
18 forces backgrounds, we call them consultants, but  
19 they're SEALS.

20 And what they do is, assess the site and  
21 imagine attack vectors that they think would be most  
22 successful in exploiting the site's protective  
23 strategy. We assume, during those exercises, that we  
24 have a fully compliant insider who provides our attack  
25 force detailed information about the vulnerabilities of

1 the plant, and then we exploit that information, to the  
2 best of our ability, to challenge the site's protective  
3 strategy.

4 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Oh, that's terrific. Thank you  
5 very much. Well, not terrific -- it's terrific that  
6 you're doing that. Richard, do you want to have the  
7 last comment on this and then we have to move on?

8 MR. MCPHERSON: Two days after 9/11, I went back to  
9 work and been dealing in the threat issue, that's one  
10 of the areas I've been dealing with and we've had 61  
11 meetings of this in Washington, DC, with lots of folks,  
12 and we have looked at every conceivable threat there  
13 is.

14 I was one of the people who was picked and we  
15 had some nuclear power plants and water plants to look  
16 at right after 9/11; we did that for two years. And I  
17 can tell you that, from a threat standpoint, every  
18 conceivable threat and beyond has been looked at and  
19 has been studied and it's in the pipeline to the NRC or  
20 the NRC already has, which I believe they have, to make  
21 the current changes and future changes.

22 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay. Thank you.

23 MR. MCPHERSON: The best I can say.

24 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Thank you very much. Thank you  
25 to the gentlemen from the NRC and thank you, Ross.

1           We're now going to switch to the next segment  
2 of the meeting, which is an update on the  
3 decommissioning process. A lot has been going on,  
4 including many developments related to the ISFSI and  
5 the spent fuel storage. So, Tom Palmisano, you're  
6 going to give us a briefing on where that stands and  
7 we've seen in the press, in the last few days, in the  
8 blog sphere a variety of comments and so I think you  
9 added a couple of slides to your presentation to  
10 address some of those as well.

11           MR. PALMISANO: Yes. Thank you, David.

12           So, normally I would go earlier in the agenda  
13 to talk more about a general decommissioning update.  
14 Because of tonight's topic, we wanted to start fairly  
15 quickly with security.

16           So this may be a briefer update than normal.  
17 In the next meeting, we'll come in with a typical  
18 longer update, but there's important things I'd like to  
19 brief you on. One of which -- this doesn't appear to  
20 work. So, next slide, please.

21           Okay. So just -- we didn't open the meeting  
22 with our principle, Safety Stewardship Engagement.  
23 We're really working hard to engage and be transparent  
24 and have a good dialogue, whether we ultimately agree  
25 with each other, there are some things we never will,

1 but we really want a good dialogue about issues and  
2 questions. And, again, we appreciate the NRC being  
3 here as part of that dialogue tonight.

4 Next slide. Decommissioning Update, next  
5 slide. Hard to see, nothing really on the milestone  
6 since December to mention when we awarded the spent  
7 fuel installation contract. This is really  
8 historically, for historical purposes. It's on our  
9 website.

10 Next slide. Decommission Plan. We had hard  
11 copies passed out. Manuel, did all the audience get  
12 these? Okay. So we took your feedback that this is  
13 awfully hard to read, and I appreciate that.

14 A 20-year time line, not to scale. The bold,  
15 gold vertical line is January 2016, so the first  
16 quarter of 2016 all the activities on the left are  
17 really preliminary activities before major  
18 decommissioning start.

19 So major decommissioning will start sometime  
20 in 2016 or later. So, up on the left, things like  
21 System Retirement, implementing cold and dark,  
22 decommissioning power ring. This is all configuring  
23 the plant to remove all power sources, all energy  
24 sources, making the plant safe physically.

25 We've removed all chemicals, and oils, and

1 gases we used to use while we operate. We removed all  
2 the lead acid batteries that we no longer need, so it's  
3 just really getting the plant to a very fundamentally  
4 low energy and safe condition.

5 The middle, Permanently Defueled Tech Specs,  
6 the Emergency Plan; these are the NRC licensing changes  
7 we need to make, and these were submitted in March of  
8 2014 and are due for approval second -- mid-to-late  
9 second quarter of 2015 and we'll implement these.

10 The ISFSI project, independent spent fuel  
11 storage. This is the expansion. I'm going to show you  
12 some slides on the Holtec system, actually, having been  
13 completed at another plant. We've selected the vendor  
14 and we're now starting through the California Coastal  
15 Commission Permitting process to get permission to  
16 expand the ISFSI.

17 We submitted the application. We have some  
18 questions to give them complete information and that  
19 would play out to about an eight-to-twelve month time  
20 line by the Coastal Commission before we're approved to  
21 proceed with physical work on site.

22 Right here, IFMP, the Irradiated Fuel Manage  
23 Plan, decommissioning cost estimate and post-shutdown  
24 decommissioning activity report. These are three very  
25 specific NRC decommissioning submittal we made last

1 fall. Some of you may remember we had one or two  
2 meetings on these in detail last summer, where we  
3 walked through these in some detail, fairly dry  
4 meetings, I admit, but we went through what's in these.

5 So the decommissioning cost estimate to  
6 post-shutdown decommissioning report, the NRC  
7 requirement is we submit these and they have 90 days to  
8 review them before we would start any decommissioning  
9 activities. They were submitted last September, the 90  
10 days was completed in December, the NRC has told us  
11 they have no significant comments, so those two have  
12 been accepted.

13 The irradiated fuel management plan, the NRC  
14 writes a safety evaluation so that is about a  
15 six-to-eight month process and I'm expecting that to be  
16 issued sometime this summer. Historical Site  
17 Assessment Site Characterization. This is kind of a  
18 baseline assessment of the radiological and other  
19 contamination on the site after years of operation. We  
20 do this as part of our planning.

21 And, ultimately, 10 years down the road, this  
22 would be what we use to demonstrate we've cleaned up  
23 the site to the NRC and other criteria in terms of  
24 remediation. So this is early characterization work  
25 for the planning activities.

1           And then we're evaluating how best to select a  
2 large general contractor who will actually do the  
3 10-year dismantling period. So everything to the left  
4 of the line is really the preliminary activities, the  
5 physical changes, the licensing changes, or the  
6 decommissioning specifics submittals.

7           The ISFSI itself, depending on the permitting  
8 path, will be expanded physically in 2016 and the fuel  
9 pools off-loaded in the 2017-2018 time frame, so the  
10 fuel will stay in spent fuel pools until 2017-2018.

11           Once the ISFSIs are completed and acceptable,  
12 we'll then finish off-loading the fuel pools. And then  
13 at the end of the 20-year period, the completion of the  
14 radiological decommissioning, the NRC's actual license  
15 termination process, which is a license amendment  
16 process to -- and the word is "terminate," but it's  
17 actually reduce the part-50 license to just the ISFSI,  
18 that's what typically is done in decommissioning plans.

19           And then the final non-radiological site  
20 restoration to the Navy's satisfaction, that's where  
21 that'll occur. And at the end of 20 years, the site  
22 will be reduced to the ISFSI only and then going  
23 forward until the fuel is moved off site somewhere to  
24 where Rancho Seco is or Humboldt Bay is.

25           Next slide. Spent fuel storage is certainly

1 an important topic we want to talk about every time.  
2 Nothing has changed on this slide you've heard me cover  
3 before. The lower left in green is the canisters that  
4 are already loaded with fuel from units 1, 2 and 3 on  
5 the ISFSI pad. 51 canisters, 50 with fuel, and 1 with  
6 greater than Class-C waste.

7 270 fuel assemblies we ship. We actually ship  
8 fuel out of San Onofre back in the late '70s to the  
9 '80s. They were shipped to GE Morris, Illinois, that  
10 are stored in a spent fuel pool there. And what's in  
11 yellow is the assemblies and the two spent fuel pools,  
12 Unit 2 and Unit 3, just showing once we expand the  
13 ISFSI, we'll load these canisters.

14 And at the end of that process, the canisters  
15 will be on site with 3,855 fuel assemblies and  
16 approximately 125 canisters.

17 Next slide. Now, we selected the Holtec  
18 System. We're showing you some schematic drawings from  
19 Holtec. This system, the predecessor is in service and  
20 loaded in Humboldt Bay today and I've shown you  
21 pictures of that before. The system has just been  
22 constructed at another nuclear power plant, so I want  
23 to show you the pictures under construction, so  
24 hopefully everybody in the panel can see this next  
25 slide.

1           So this is -- although it's called an  
2 underground system, this plant is in the Midwest, a  
3 little different layout than ours. But, basically, we  
4 excavate down to a certain level. And in our case,  
5 we're going to excavate down not too far because we're  
6 going to stay above ground water.

7           Next slide. What you do, you first build a  
8 seismically-designed and install heavily reinforced  
9 concrete pad, that's steel. Those of you who can see  
10 that up close, that's a lot of reinforcing steel, a  
11 very thick concrete pad.

12           Next slide. These are the vertical canister  
13 enclosures. They call them cavity enclosures. So this  
14 pad has now been completed, built to certain  
15 specifications, including seismic specifications. The  
16 canisters are set in place. You can see people  
17 standing next to the canisters, so you get a feel for  
18 the physical size.

19           Next slide. Around these canisters, they are  
20 totally encompassed by concrete. Next slide. You now  
21 see the top of those canisters where they have poured  
22 -- continuously poured concrete all around these  
23 canisters.

24           And then you see at the very top, there is  
25 about a 3-foot space there, what they do now is, they

1 put another concrete reinforced pad on top of the large  
2 concrete pour. Next slide. That is what the completed  
3 facility looks like with the final concrete pad on top  
4 around the top of the canisters. So under each one of  
5 the rectangles is a vertical canister where the spent  
6 fuel steel canisters will be inserted for storage.

7 Next slide. So I wanted to share that with  
8 you because we looked at schematic diagrams, but this  
9 has just been completed. We visited the site twice  
10 during construction; had a good look at how this is  
11 built and how is constructed, and they were gracious  
12 enough to let me share the pictures with you.

13 So, let me give you a licensing status. This  
14 is the topic we talk about periodically. So the  
15 current system at San Onofre, we have two NUHOMS  
16 Transnuclear systems. These are the horizontal  
17 systems. Those of you who have been at our other  
18 meetings, I didn't bring those pictures, but you  
19 remember the horizontal above-ground system, that's  
20 loaded today.

21 We have two -- two types: 24 PT-1 and 24  
22 PT-4. "24" means they each hold 24 fuel assemblies.  
23 24 PT-1 system, which is unit 1 fuel, is licensed for  
24 storage. That is a certificate of compliance. You can  
25 look it up on the NRC website. It is licensed for

1 transportation today in the MP187 transport cask.

2 The unit 2 and 3 fuel 24 assemblies in the  
3 PT-4 canister, it is licensed for storage today,  
4 including high burnup, and it is licensed for  
5 transportation in the MP197-HP, high burnup,  
6 transportation canister.

7 The UMax System, the new system, the NRC has  
8 issued amendment to Rev zero of their license. It was  
9 effective April 6, 2015. Holtec has already submitted  
10 the amendment for the seismic spectrum. They submitted  
11 that in July 2014. Typically, 18 months to 24 months,  
12 the NRC is telling us and Holtec they expect to approve  
13 the SONGS seismic spectrum.

14 So just like we do with the NUHOMS system, for  
15 somebody who remember last year's meetings, the NUHOMS  
16 system is licensed for storage, but we at SONGS have a  
17 higher seismic requirement that we've applied to the  
18 spent fuel storage canister, actually, even higher than  
19 the reactors were designed for.

20 So, what NUHOMS and Transnuclear had to do was  
21 submit an amendment to license our canisters for the  
22 higher seismic spectrum. Holtec is doing the same  
23 thing. They have their initial license. By the end of  
24 the year, hopefully by September they'll have the  
25 amendment for the higher seismic requirements for

1 SONGS.

2 And then transportation license, the specific  
3 transportation canisters for this system, they're going  
4 to submit for the transportation license 2015, that's  
5 about a two-year process. So Holtec has a number of  
6 transportation casks already licensed for the earlier  
7 cask designs, including things like at Diablo Canyon.

8 So they will then now proceed to license this  
9 once they complete this licensing work. So that's the  
10 licensing status for the canisters currently at  
11 San Onofre or planned for San Onofre.

12 Next slide. Regulatory submittals and  
13 upcoming public meetings. Next slide. Submittals. We  
14 kind of touched on some of these, some things that were  
15 approved last year, I'm not going to really touch on  
16 those. I mentioned that the NRC accepted the PSDAR and  
17 DCE; after the 90 days they had no significant comment,  
18 so they're accepted.

19 They will provide us an official letter in the  
20 second quarter. The irradiated fuel management plan is  
21 coming. The defuel emergency plan, there is three  
22 different things we submitted: Exemption request and  
23 two license amendments. The NRC Commission approved  
24 the exemption request in early March. They're not yet  
25 issued. They will be issued with the two license

1 amendments, which I expect in the second quarter of  
2 2015.

3 MEMBER OF PUBLIC: Exemption from what?

4 MR. PALMISANO: Pardon?

5 MEMBER OF PUBLIC: Exemption from what?

6 MR. PALMISANO: There are some emergency plan  
7 requirements that the NRC has some criteria and that's  
8 posted on the website. I'll be glad to point you to  
9 that. So, next slide.

10 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Let me -- let me just make a  
11 footnote here, which is, in part because the NRC got  
12 focused on other regulatory tasks after September 11  
13 and then after Fukushima, there isn't streamlined  
14 system for dealing with plants that are in  
15 decommissioning.

16 MR. PALMISANO: Right.

17 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: And, therefore, a number of the  
18 normal regulatory changes that would happen when you  
19 change a plant like this, from an active plant to a  
20 non-active plant, are actually handled as a formal  
21 administrative legal matter as exemptions as opposed to  
22 as new rules. And so, frankly, I hate the word  
23 "exemption" here, but it's what -- it's what happening  
24 as a matter of administrative law.

25 MR. PALMISANO: Thank you. Next slide. Upcoming

1 public meetings. So we had a request from some of the  
2 public comments to find a way to show you meetings that  
3 are coming up, so this is just the first cut. I'll be  
4 looking to add to this.

5 So a little historical: There was an annual  
6 reef workshop at the Ocean Institute recently. I  
7 already talked about the California Energy Commission  
8 meeting on decommissioning on April 27th, which we,  
9 Pacific Gas and Electric, David Victor, David Lockbaum,  
10 others will be talking about nuclear topics.

11 There's a Wetlands Technical workshop in May.  
12 And anticipating the ISFSI permit for the expansion to  
13 be considered somewhere in the third to fourth quarter  
14 of the Coastal Commission. It's a little early for  
15 them to actually schedule which meeting it would go to.

16 We want to make sure we keep this in front of  
17 you and we'll make sure this is on our website, so if  
18 you have interest, you can certainly look to attend or  
19 at least pay attention to that.

20 Next slide. David Victor mentioned earlier  
21 public walking tours as part of our outreach. We're  
22 looking to do more than certainly a Community  
23 Engagement Panel, so a couple of things:

24 We've opened up a public walking tour program.  
25 We've now had more than 300 people tour the plant.

1 It's easy to sign up for it. We run them during the  
2 week or on the weekend, for people who can't make it  
3 during the week. For certain groups, we can make  
4 special arrangements, for example, for a school group  
5 or a Boy Scout group.

6 This has been very well received. It's a  
7 simple tour. We stay outside the protected area, but  
8 you get a good view of the plant and some of the  
9 facilities. And then we also run public education  
10 fairs, where in the evening we go out into the  
11 community and make ourselves available to people to  
12 talk and answer questions. The next one is June 11.  
13 We've not yet determined the venue for that.

14 Next slide. So that's a brief update, given  
15 our main topic of security, but I wanted just to keep  
16 the panel and the public up to date on where we are on  
17 some key topics.

18 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Thank you, Tom.

19 MR. PALMISANO: Thank you.

20 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: I think it's very helpful to get  
21 those updates. And I think it's a good idea that we  
22 get some kind of an evergreen calendar on the website.

23 MR. PALMISANO: Right.

24 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: So people can see the larger  
25 events that are happening to the public.

1 MR. PALMISANO: So, questions?

2 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: This was intended as an  
3 informational item, but let me see if there are any  
4 particular questions related to this.

5 Richard, is your flag up? Or --

6 MR. MCPHERSON: There was a GATES teacher up in  
7 Huntington Beach who went on one of those tours, and  
8 she asked me up to give her a talk to her people about  
9 science stuff every year and she was impressed with the  
10 guy that led the tour, but I don't know who it was.  
11 And there was some detractors there and he handled the  
12 stuff that she knew to be untrue, he handled it very  
13 well.

14 MR. PALMISANO: Okay. I appreciate that. These  
15 are our employees who volunteer to be tour guides and  
16 we -- we encourage them to do that and we appreciate  
17 their support, and it's good to get feedback, and we  
18 just want people to come in and talk.

19 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay. Thank you very much. Any  
20 other comments or questions? We'll take a five-minute  
21 break now and then we're going to go to the public  
22 comment segment of the meeting. Thank you, Tom.

23 MR. PALMISANO: Thank you.

24 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Please if you want --

25 (A brief recess was taken.)

1 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Let's -- let's get settled here.

2 MEMBER OF PUBLIC: (Inaudible.)

3 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Let's get settled here. The  
4 comment cards are not quite as crystallized as they  
5 have been in meetings past, so we're going to have a  
6 little more of the 3-minute modes than normal. First  
7 question from Audrey Prosser about safety and then I  
8 have a question from Al White, from San Clemente, about  
9 the security plan, as I understand, the role of humans.

10 So, Audrey Prosser? And you're keeping the  
11 clock and we've got three minutes for each comment.

12 MEMBER OF PUBLIC: Correct.

13 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: And if I see other comments that  
14 relate to your comment, then I'll hopefully get --  
15 stitch them together. Audrey, the floor is yours.

16 MS. PROSSER: Thank you. I'd like to ask a  
17 question of the representatives from the NRC that are  
18 here. Soon after 9/11, there was a no-fly zone  
19 implemented over San Onofre and very soon after that it  
20 was abandoned.

21 With hearing Mr. Palmisano say that they had  
22 no means of shooting a plane down, I understand that  
23 2,000 -- you can fly as low as 2,000 feet over -- over  
24 San Onofre now, according to pilots -- pilots that we  
25 know. So, why not reinstate that?

1           Sorry. I wasn't quite prepared to be so  
2 quick. Let me get my notes here. Our biggest concern  
3 is safety and our biggest concern is that there is no  
4 national interim solution and we all, in this room,  
5 have to admit that Yucca Mountain, it's not going to  
6 happen.

7           We just got back from Washington, DC, where we  
8 met with Senator Reid and the other representatives  
9 from Nevada, and it's unbelievable to us that 14  
10 billion dollars were spent to dig a hole in a mountain  
11 before we discovered there were geological problems and  
12 lakes and -- and Nevada owns the water rights and  
13 they're not going to license water rights to Yucca  
14 Mountain.

15           So that's one of the promises that we don't  
16 see happening from all the research we've been doing.  
17 And, for 50 years, we've been promised that the nuclear  
18 waste would be moved and, as of today, they don't have  
19 any place to move it to, and I'm concerned about the  
20 Holtec System being buried, not being able to move it.

21           Although, I believe, I read on Edison's  
22 website that they were going to do research on how to  
23 inspect it underground, but currently there is no  
24 system. So, and the NRC's regulations call for it  
25 being stored above ground, but now we're talking about

1 below ground.

2 So we have a great concern that it can't be  
3 inspected and maintained. We honestly would like to  
4 have a little more openness. We've been many promises  
5 that it's safe even after the plume of nuclear toxic  
6 spewed from the plant, so we'd like more dialogue  
7 and -- and information where the community can engage  
8 not -- with the panel on the website.

9 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay.

10 MS. PROSSER: Thank you very much.

11 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Thank you very much for that.

12 Let me just ask very briefly, do you have 15 seconds on  
13 the issue of the no-fly zone?

14 MR. HAIRE: Yeah, I would just say I'm not an  
15 aviator and I don't know what the right term is, but I  
16 do know there are controls over how aircraft are  
17 allowed to fly around nuclear power plants.

18 And I do know that, in response to the  
19 question about what is the threat, we don't require  
20 licensees and we don't allow, I think, licensees to  
21 shoot down aircraft over their site.

22 But we have had over the time period since  
23 9/11 occasions where pilots have wandered into air  
24 space that's restricted and they've been engaged by  
25 national defense assets and have been educated on where

1 they're allowed to fly.

2 And so we do have a response posture, we do  
3 have a monitoring system, and we do engage when people  
4 are flying in areas they're -- they're not suppose to.

5 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: The response -- the educational  
6 process is very different when you're being escorted by  
7 an F-16. So let me just say one other thing, which is,  
8 the monitoring of aircraft varies a lot by flight plan  
9 command and the kinds of aircraft that people worry  
10 about are on flight plans where there is a lot more  
11 control than just the 2,000 foot no-fly zone.

12 Let me say that the end of your comment  
13 resonates very much with a comment that Ms. Boarchman  
14 has made to us and sent in this afternoon. She's  
15 watching this via live streaming, but can't be here  
16 today. She's in Escondido, California, and is urging  
17 us and the CEP to make sure that the processes of the  
18 emergency plan modifications and exemptions and so on,  
19 that that's done in a completely public way, that's,  
20 obviously, compliant with the law, but it's done in a  
21 way that facilitates public input.

22 And so I don't know, Tom, if you want to talk  
23 briefly about how we can do better on that front.  
24 We're getting lots of notifications sent around, but  
25 maybe this process of making calendars available on

1 SONGScommunity.com would help us in making the public  
2 aware of these various milestones and how to input.

3 MR. PALMISANO: Yeah, with respect to the  
4 calendars, certainly we'll start adding more milestones  
5 and we'll work with the panel officers in terms of what  
6 milestones you would like to see on there, whether it's  
7 upcoming NRC activities or California activities or  
8 Coastal Commission activities.

9 With respect to the emergency plan, you know,  
10 we filed those changes in March of 2014 and we spent  
11 several meetings last year, talking through the detail  
12 with the panel and, you know, with the public and the  
13 NRC has had open comment period on those.

14 So we'll make sure, as we get close to  
15 implementation, that we make sure the panel and the  
16 public are aware.

17 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay. That'll be helpful. And  
18 Ms. Boarchman, I only saw her letter tonight. I'll  
19 make her letter available to the CEP and put it on the  
20 website.

21 MR. PALMISANO: Right.

22 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Let me ask Al White, you've said  
23 that you have some criticisms concerning humans and  
24 whether humans are involved in the process. Mr. White,  
25 do you want to comment? I couldn't fully read your

1 handwriting and so -- it says, "Over for my major  
2 criticism." And I turn it over and, it says, "Turn  
3 over for my major criticism."

4 And then back on the front page, it says, "It  
5 appears to me that the lack of human beings -- there's  
6 a lack of human beings in all parts of the process,"  
7 and I'm not entirely sure what the comment is, so maybe  
8 you can stand up and make the comment.

9 MEMBER OF PUBLIC: I think he's gone.

10 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: He's gone? Okay. Well, we'll  
11 follow up with him and find out what his concern is.

12 Roger Johnson, the floor is yours. You said  
13 you had a comment about security.

14 MR. JOHNSON: Thank you. I'm a little disappointed  
15 in some of the discussions so far tonight about  
16 security. What we heard was not defense against --  
17 safety and defense, what we heard is defense against  
18 NRC defined threats, that's all we've heard.

19 There's a lot of threats that the NRC doesn't  
20 deal with and we didn't hear about those, for example,  
21 missile attacks, drone attacks, truck bombs,  
22 surface-to-air missiles, all kinds of high explosives,  
23 so those are the kinds of things that are a real  
24 threat.

25 What we've heard is a lot about bad guys with

1 guns, climbing over fences with a hand grenade or  
2 something and I think we're really worried about the  
3 other kind of things. And so another thing I'm  
4 disappointed in is that there was no mention one of  
5 the -- one of the best studies done about this by the  
6 National Academy of Scientists published in 2007, I  
7 think, about terrorist attacks on fuel pools and dry  
8 cask storage.

9           And it's is a long report, it went into a lot  
10 of details -- details, it was done by the Sandia  
11 National Labs and they concluded that there are  
12 definitely scenarios under which the plants could be  
13 severely damaged, causing release of radioactive  
14 plumes. Some of the things I said were a truck bomb, a  
15 medium sized-truck bomb, outside the perimeter of a  
16 plant can cause significant damage.

17           The truck bomb barriers have to be 500 feet  
18 from the plant. 500 feet from the plant, there's the  
19 Pacific Ocean and I-5, if you can imagine the scenario  
20 of, say, 10, 15, 20 RVs or pickup trucks driving to the  
21 parking lots of San Onofre and they all have mortar  
22 launchers inside and they open up, they could launch  
23 1,000 mortar shells within 10 minutes, they could have  
24 a shoulder-to-air fire missiles that shoot down the  
25 helicopters.

1           They could do a tremendous amount of damage,  
2 they would penetrate the walls, they would knock out  
3 the power, the pipes, the security systems, all kinds  
4 of stuff, and it would just be absolutely devastating.  
5 So, anybody can drive and notice -- you can have -- you  
6 could have terrorists anywhere. There's all kinds of  
7 scenarios that we worry about.

8           So, I think, the original -- the way you start  
9 the meeting was very good. The only real safety is to  
10 get that stuff out of here and is true that it's not  
11 safe anywhere, but it's better to have a major incident  
12 in an unpopulated area and so it's of no interest to  
13 terrorists.

14           This area is of extreme interest to  
15 terrorists. You could take out all of Southern  
16 California, Los Angeles, San Diego, Marine Base Camp  
17 Pendleton is toast, and that is a very attractive  
18 target. And we should be moving the stuff somewhere  
19 else and, I think, on an interim basis, so I hope you  
20 follow up on that original plan, and I think that's the  
21 most productive thing. All those transport casks are  
22 movable, in theory, so I'd say let's get this stuff  
23 moved out. Thank you.

24           CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay. Thank you very much for  
25 that. I just want to ask the NRC, I believe you may

1 have even commissioned the academy study. I assume  
2 that when the academy does a study like this about  
3 threats against nuclear reactors, you guys read it and  
4 then adjust the rules. Is that, more or less,  
5 accurate?

6 MR. HAIRE: I have to apologize and say I'm not  
7 personally well read on the study, but if I can phone a  
8 friend. Yeah, so we don't --

9 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Are you his Lifeline?

10 MR. HAIRE: Tony is another representative of the  
11 NRC. I thought he might have some knowledge on this  
12 issue. We didn't -- we didn't bring knowledge of the  
13 Sandia study along with us to be able to answer this.

14 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay. And it was unfair of me to  
15 put you on the spot. Let me make this commitment,  
16 which is, we'll find that study. There have been  
17 several studies done since September 11 about a variety  
18 of threats to the national infrastructure, including  
19 threats specifically to nuclear plants.

20 The National Academy of Science is essentially  
21 involved in many of these studies and many of them are  
22 commissioned either by the -- by the Security Apparatus  
23 of the United States or by the regulators. And so why  
24 don't we just pull together a few of those and  
25 understand what's happened with these?

1           Because -- I appreciate your point, Roger. I  
2 do think the system has been reading that information  
3 more widely and then they can turn into regulations and  
4 that's maybe why the discussion tonight was more  
5 focused on regulatory issues and to find threats, then,  
6 maybe would be your appetite, but I think the defined  
7 threats, in part, reflect those assessments.

8           MR. HAIRE: Dr. Victor?

9           CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Yes.

10          MR. HAIRE: Could I make one more comment?

11          CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Please.

12          MR. HAIRE: There was a -- the gentleman listed a  
13 number of threats that were not discussed tonight and  
14 it included some concerns about how explosives and  
15 vehicle proximity and I would say that we do evaluate  
16 those kinds of threats; some of those issues are  
17 incorporated into our requirements for what the utility  
18 has to defend against.

19                 We don't go into those kinds of details about  
20 the specific types of threats that we require them to  
21 defend against or the specific numbers or standoff  
22 distances, but we do require a particular vehicle  
23 barrier system in recognition that you can put a fairly  
24 large amount of high explosives in vehicles, so we  
25 require a minimum standoff distance in a vehicle

1 barrier system that protects against that.

2 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay. Thank you very much. We  
3 have a question here from Marni Magda about the waste  
4 strategy, Secretary Moniz, who gave a speech about this  
5 in late March, and Marni would like us to summarize  
6 what Ernie said.

7 Why don't I get Ernie's speech and just make  
8 it a public record? I think for us, my read of that  
9 is, one of the most interesting things is, the  
10 Department of Energy itself is frustrated with the  
11 difficulties at Yucca and so it's pursuing its own  
12 strategies for disposing of its own high-level waste.  
13 It has very urgent problems, as all of us know.

14 In the course of putting together this memo,  
15 we had some conversations with Per Peterson, who among  
16 other things, made the point that the new DOE strategy  
17 would include also some investment in new technologies  
18 for storage, like deep-bore holes.

19 So there's -- there's actual potential to  
20 really improve the potential for long-term storage with  
21 technological innovation. We just haven't been doing  
22 very much of it because of the Yucca problem, and so I  
23 think that's a sign that the DOE right now is focused  
24 on these things. I'll get the speech and make it  
25 available to everybody.

1           Marni, did you have other comments that you  
2 wanted to make? Because, we're in the process of  
3 moving over to the topic of -- our favorite topic of  
4 spent fuel storage and so, maybe, some of your comments  
5 are in that area, if you want to make those.

6           MS. MAGDA: Is that all right, to move into that?  
7 Okay. Thank you. His speech was very exciting in that  
8 he is first focusing on military because he can do that  
9 without the law changing, we would have to change  
10 federal law in order to allow there to be interim  
11 storage.

12           We're trying to get in California a resolution  
13 right now with the Democrat party to get some of that  
14 legislation taking place, we're trying to get the  
15 Republicans as well. Southern California Edison helped  
16 with that language of the Democrat resolution, and  
17 we're working with the Republicans. We need everybody.  
18 So I'm hoping that we will get that legislation to  
19 allow an interim solution.

20           My concern is that we continue to try and make  
21 everyone feel safe with where we are, and what we  
22 should really be doing is spending all this energy on  
23 getting it moved out of here. When you spoke of the  
24 Yucca -- Yucca Mountain, he said it would not happen.

25           When he spoke of WIPP, he really let us know

1 that that isolation plant that had contamination will  
2 not be open for four years, not just two, but not  
3 working for four, and that's from a very tiny mistake  
4 that is costing billions of dollars and four years of  
5 an isolation plant that is private.

6 So I am continuing to ask that we have DOD  
7 inspection, not just the NRC, but we actually get  
8 someone in there that begins to realize that we can't  
9 have people who don't understand nuclear radiation in  
10 charge of watching it.

11 I'm going to bring up the workshop on the  
12 degradation of concrete, spent nuclear fuel, dry cask  
13 storage systems on February 25th, I listened to a  
14 Nuclear Regulatory Commission meeting and I can give  
15 you, on page 144 through 160, they're talking about  
16 "What in the world are we going to do to inspect  
17 underground cement, the degradation of it?"

18 And they go, "Oh, maybe we should excavate."  
19 Well, that would be kind of dangerous." And then they  
20 all, "Maybe in one year, maybe in two years. Can we  
21 tell from the top if it's going to be okay? Do we need  
22 to look inside in any way?"

23 And as I went -- as I'm listening, I'm  
24 starting, as I am tonight, stuttering. It's in all of  
25 their language. These are the experts on degradation

1 of cement and they are in front of -- there's 10 of us  
2 listening on the United States, they're making it up,  
3 they're trying to figure it out, and they do speak of  
4 it being 200 feet from the ocean.

5 So I just want you to know that it is very  
6 frightening to me that we have a system going in that  
7 is an experiment and I'm terrified that we're going to  
8 bury it there and not get it moved, so let's focus on  
9 consent-based moving it out of here right away.

10 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Thank you very much. Let me just  
11 ask Chris Johnston. You had a comment, also, about  
12 Holtec inspection. Did Marni summarize your comment?

13 MS. JOHNSTON: No, but I believe it's there.

14 MS. CONN: I just want to say one thing about  
15 security before we go on to Holtec. Is that okay?

16 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Well, we're going to come back to  
17 security in just a moment.

18 MS. MAGDA: Okay. Fine.

19 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: So, on Holtec, maybe we could --  
20 we want to stay there.

21 MS. CONN: I have something to say about Holtec,  
22 too, if you want, but --

23 MS. JOHNSTON: I actually changed my question.  
24 Hope you don't mind. It was sort of based on  
25 another -- some comments that were made, I believe, by

1 Ross. Yeah. And you were talking about basically  
2 personnel that's hired to look at the plant and I was  
3 sort of wondering if you might let me know what  
4 screening, as you use so many personnel from the  
5 military to -- right? Correct? You use a lot of  
6 military people? Yes?

7 MR. QUAM: Correct.

8 MS. JOHNSTON: Uh-huh. What is the percentage? Do  
9 you mind? Do you have any idea what percentage?

10 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Why don't you ask your question?  
11 Make your comment and then ask your question.

12 MS. JOHNSTON: Okay. My -- my question is, I want  
13 to know, from my own line of work, very specifically  
14 what is the type of testing that's done for  
15 posttraumatic stress disorder?

16 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay. That is your comment.  
17 okay. Why don't we get an answer?

18 MR. QUAM: MMPI or psychological?

19 MS. JOHNSTON: And I'd like to know who does, who  
20 does the testing?

21 MR. QUAM: We have two doctors that are contracted.

22 MS. JOHNSTON: Uh-huh, and what is the testing?

23 MR. QUAM: It's a standard MMPI.

24 MS. JOHNSTON: Uh-huh, okay.

25 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Hold on. Why don't you ask your

1 question? Are you done asking the question?

2 MS. JOHNSTON: Yes, that's what I wanted to know.  
3 I wanted to make certain there was -- there was some  
4 testing and some screening done and the MMPI is a good  
5 test. Okay. Thank you.

6 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Thank you very much. And you  
7 answered the question.

8 MR. QUAM: Yes.

9 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: So thank you very much. We're  
10 not -- we're not going to do the Q&A if we can't  
11 organize ourselves, so please bear with me, part of my  
12 job in making the meeting efficient is to ask people to  
13 make their comments and then we'll get questions --  
14 responses to as many questions as possible. So, please  
15 bear with me on that.

16 So, Donna Gilmore, did you want to make a  
17 comment?

18 MS. GILMORE: Oh, no. Wake you up a little. Okay.

19 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: I am awake.

20 MS. GILMORE: I'm working with the California  
21 Public Utility Commission. I'm intervening in the  
22 decommissioning proceeding because I believe that  
23 Edison should not be allowed to spend money on  
24 decommissioning and canister systems without a review  
25 beforehand to ensure that they're making the right

1 decisions.

2           And on the dry cask systems I agree with  
3 Marni's comment about the concrete. I listened in on  
4 that. There is no way to inspect an underground  
5 concrete system. This is an experimental system that's  
6 never been tested, never been used anywhere in the  
7 world. The Humboldt Bay system is totally different  
8 system. I totally researched that one.

9           So this is brand new, this is another  
10 experiment on Southern California and it's known that  
11 the canisters are subject to cracking from stress  
12 corrosion cracking. The Diablo Canyon has a canister  
13 that has all the conditions for cracking in only two  
14 years. The NRC -- I have documentation from the NRC  
15 that they said once there's a crack, 16 years of crack  
16 could go all the way through.

17           So you know, security -- I mean, with security  
18 you need to be able to see something. We can't even  
19 see these cracks, so I think our real security threat  
20 is within. We're using containers that cannot be  
21 inspected, cannot be repaired, and we don't know if  
22 they're cracked now, we won't know when they're  
23 cracked.

24           And then if you want to take a canister, you  
25 can't inspect and transport it on a rail system or a

1 road system that may have cracks in it and it's going  
2 to continue to crack as you go. I would not want to be  
3 that community on the other end, trying to unload the  
4 transport cask and then having to put it in,  
5 apparently, another hole on the other end because with  
6 these kind of containers you have the big cement part  
7 that you have to build and pay for and we paid for.

8 The way you move that is you take the thin  
9 half-inch, 5-inch canister out, put it in a --  
10 eventually put it in a transportation cask, move it to  
11 the other end, and then you have to have something  
12 built on the other end, so that's a whole lot more  
13 money.

14 If you were using the thick cask like they use  
15 in Germany or even the ones they use -- even the ones  
16 the French make, they're thick enough that you don't  
17 need to build a concrete infrastructure, so they would  
18 be ready to roll for everybody that's wanting to move,  
19 you save a whole lot of money because it's already  
20 built to be, you know, transported and -- and in, you  
21 know, storage or transport. It's already designed for  
22 that. So there is a big money saving.

23 And I believe that the system is going to fail  
24 prematurely and -- it's going to fail prematurely and  
25 we're going to have to spend over -- another 1.3

1 billion dollars to replace it prematurely and there is  
2 no money to do that.

3 So, I think that issue needs to be -- I know  
4 we talked about it a lot.

5 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay.

6 MS. GILMORE: It's just because we haven't --  
7 because you haven't satisfactorily answered our  
8 questions.

9 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay. Thank you very much. So I  
10 wanted to just -- I wanted to pick up on the issue that  
11 you raised about the inspection of the canisters, it  
12 was in Marni Magda's comments as well. Sandy Stiasm.  
13 Am I pronouncing your last name correctly?

14 You said you also wanted to say the public  
15 safety concerns are more from within. And with that,  
16 is it the same issue that Donna just raised? Or did  
17 you want to make a comment on that? I want to collect  
18 these because they're all the same comment, not the  
19 same comment, but on the same theme and I want to  
20 suggest a way forward on this.

21 MR. STIASM: Good evening my name is -- excuse  
22 me -- Sandy Stiasm. I'm an Orange County resident, I  
23 live in Irvine. I'm a member of the Green Party. I've  
24 served on its central committee on and off over the  
25 last 10 years, our political party was the only

1 political party in Orange County which opposed the  
2 continuing revamp of SONGS, everyone else sort of fell  
3 into place after us.

4 Very appropriate for me to continue after  
5 Donna. There's been a lot of infesting speculation  
6 this evening about how a decommissioned SONGS will  
7 withstand external threats. But I think many people  
8 who live within 30 miles of this plant are more focused  
9 on the best storage strategy, the threat from within.

10 While, by default, it remains for Edison to  
11 remediate many aspects of this plant. I question how  
12 much authority as public officials and the citizens we  
13 can safely entrust to this company. This is the same  
14 company which first lied about the extent of plant  
15 operations defects. This is the same company, which  
16 less than truthfully, outlined the impact upon the grid  
17 if SONGS were taken out of operation.

18 This is the same company which lied to its  
19 workers and their union officials about job safety at  
20 SONGS, and this is the same company which is trying  
21 convince both citizens and public officials that it has  
22 the nuclear waste option handled.

23 The question I'd like to end on is, as public  
24 officials, how much authority do you want continue to  
25 give this private company? And to what extent, as

1 public officials, at the local, regional, state and  
2 federal level do you want take to ensure the long-term  
3 safety of all residents in Orange County? Thank you.

4 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay. Thank you very much for  
5 your comments. So I want to say something briefly  
6 about how we can collect these last few comments and  
7 make sure that we act on them. At the meeting we had  
8 last October with the two cask vendors, this is before  
9 Edison made the decision to purchase the Holtec design,  
10 we had a discussion, extensive discussion, about the  
11 capacity to monitor and detect and repair, if  
12 necessary, and a variety of views about whether it's a  
13 good idea to repair the canisters versus just putting  
14 it into a transport cask, and that's not a conversation  
15 we're going to rehash right now.

16 The white paper that we put together to kind  
17 of collect many of the views, which I signed  
18 individually but was a reflection of a larger process,  
19 included the recommendation, which Edison has said  
20 they -- they honor, that the Holtec plan or whatever  
21 plan is adopted, now, the Holtec plan will include a  
22 clear articulation in plain English of what defense in  
23 depth means, of how monitoring and inspection is going  
24 to take place, which kinds of schemes will be in place  
25 for repairing versus taking a damaged canister and

1 putting it into a transport cask.

2 I've checked today with Holtec to make sure  
3 that that can be done and it's in the process of being  
4 done and I've been assured that that is the case, so we  
5 will make sure as a panel that that happens and that  
6 happens in a very prompt way over the course of the  
7 next few months or half year while they're in the  
8 process of doing this new regulatory filings and so on,  
9 to make sure that we, in the community, understand how  
10 actually you would monitor degradation of concrete and,  
11 if you can't, what the consequences are of that and the  
12 same is true for the canisters and so on.

13 So I assure to you that we will have that plan  
14 in plain English and we'll have an opportunity at a  
15 future meeting to talk about that and to share that in  
16 advance so people can talk about this. We demanded  
17 that of Edison and Edison said that, along with many  
18 other things, will be part of their -- their program.

19 Is that your understanding, Tom?

20 MR. PALMISANO: Yes, that's absolutely true. We've  
21 already started with Holtec based on the comments from  
22 the panel and in the public in terms of long before the  
23 license renewal period is done and some others know  
24 when the aging managing programs are required to  
25 develop those techniques now and the capability now,

1 and at the right point we'll be glad to come in with  
2 Holtec and explain that.

3 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay. Thank you. We have  
4 several comment cards that relate to the next steps on  
5 long-term storage, which is related to this. And so I  
6 want to get C. Griffin, then Jim Cummings, and then  
7 Jennifer Massey. C. Griffin? It just says C. Griffin  
8 here. Please, sir, the floor is yours.

9 MR. GRIFFIN: My name is Charles Griffin. I'm --  
10 I'm a registered professional system engineer,  
11 developed weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons,  
12 but -- including 21 stealth bombers and rockets,  
13 defending us against tanks in Germany.

14 But also I spent most of my career developing  
15 electrical power systems for the airplanes, commercial  
16 airplanes, of DC7, DC8, DC9, DC10, in the 80s, and also  
17 in my spare time I worked with a professor at UCI on  
18 development of a fusion reaction, which was funded by  
19 Palel and it's constructed in Lake Forest with Tri-Alp  
20 Energy, with the hope of fusing hydrogen and boron  
21 together in an electric magnetic field, accelerating  
22 the ions together.

23 But part of it will not work because the ions  
24 repel each other to an astronomical value, and it's  
25 hard to overcome that. So another approach has been

1 made by students from Texas A&M over 30 years and also  
2 was funded by Paul -- by Gates, our Secretary of  
3 Defense, developed a reactor for our submarines to  
4 replace the harmful reactors in our submarines and  
5 aircraft carriers, to fuse hydrogen and Boron,  
6 emulating what happens naturally in the sun where  
7 fusion of hydrogen and boron are fused together and  
8 form carbon, which breaks up into free helium ions.

9           And the way that it's done, also, by these  
10 people at Texas A&M funded by Bob Gates for the Navy is  
11 to build a spark plug that creates a high voltage bulb  
12 of lightening, similar to what happens every day in a  
13 thunderstorm to create helium ions that radiate -- that  
14 spiral off the ions sphere by the fusion of hydrogen  
15 together in the thunderclouds into helium.

16           But to bring -- put this group in Texas, from  
17 Texas A&M and New Jersey, the [focusedfusion.org](http://focusedfusion.org) or a --  
18 [focusfusion.org](http://focusfusion.org) is their website and I encourage all of  
19 you to go to that website and study it and maybe the  
20 Edison Company, I've given them information on this,  
21 maybe that was the reason they shut down the plant,  
22 but -- and also the person, our governor and  
23 congressman, they're working on this.

24           So it's something that I think you should  
25 realize because once you fusion hydrogen and boron

1 together and create these helium ions, not only  
2 helium -- accelerated helium ions, which are positively  
3 charged with electricity, they also can be focused into  
4 a spiral and onto your radioactive waste and accelerate  
5 that radioactive waste, so you won't be storing it for  
6 eons --

7 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Excellent. Thank you.

8 MR. GRIFFIN: -- active ions, how to handle that.  
9 Thank you very much.

10 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Thank you very much for that. I  
11 think that's an important reminder that there's still a  
12 lot of innovation going on both in the power supply  
13 side and also on the waste disposal side.

14 Jim Cummings, the floor is yours.

15 MR. GRIFFIN: And yet you don't mention the public  
16 here.

17 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay. Jim Cummings?

18 MR. CUMMINGS: Well, I'm impressed what the  
19 gentleman just said. I've operated a reactor for 30  
20 years in San Onofre and I'm part of the problem, I  
21 guess, because we've created a lot of waste. We  
22 created a lot of good, too. We had 30 years of  
23 electrical power in South Orange County and I think all  
24 of us are beneficiaries today of that factor.

25 What to do with the spent fuel is an issue

1 that came up in 1976. The Atomic Energy Commission was  
2 supposed to go ahead and find a storing place for the  
3 spent fuel to go. They have failed, the NRC has failed  
4 to provide that for us, the government of the United  
5 States has failed to provide this for us.

6 This meeting is going to go on at every  
7 location throughout the country as they decommission  
8 the plants. This should not occur. You folks, for  
9 example, are on the cutting edge right now, I feel, of  
10 being able to go to congress right now with Darrell  
11 Issa, with Senator Boxer and effectively give your  
12 input to this and put pressure on Yucca Mountain to  
13 come back and be restored.

14 Senator Reid is no longer running for office.  
15 The Senator Reid's program never to bring Yucca  
16 Mountain to come to pass. He's going to be out in two  
17 years. This group of people here, I think, have a  
18 committee to go to congress and start putting pressure  
19 on the NRC, the Department of Energy, to go ahead and  
20 make a proper request to have these meetings not to  
21 continue any longer. This is foolish, totally foolish.

22 I mean, you folks are great. Don't get me  
23 wrong. But the fact that every community -- every  
24 community has got to go through this again and again  
25 and again, we have failed once again, and the

1 government has failed to do what they promised for us.

2 So those are my comments. But there was  
3 something else --

4 MEMBER OF PUBLIC: The industry has failed.

5 MR. CUMMINGS: The industry has failed. Yes, sir,  
6 it has.

7 MEMBER OF PUBLIC: Yes.

8 MR. CUMMINGS: Oh, one other thing on the subject  
9 of security. I didn't hear any word that you're going  
10 to shoot somebody. I wanted to hear that once, but it  
11 didn't happen. I'm sure it's in there somewhere in the  
12 many procedures you have you will shoot somebody, but I  
13 didn't catch on just when, but it needs to be done.

14 MR. QUAM: We said appropriate use of force.

15 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay.

16 MR. CUMMINGS: That's what I -- is it really?

17 MR. PALMISANO: And the word interdict a nuclear --

18 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Please, please, please.

19 MR. CUMMINGS: I stand corrected. Thank you.

20 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay. So your question is "Are  
21 they going to shoot people?" And his answer, Ross's  
22 answer is "Appropriate use of force."

23 MR. CUMMINGS: "Appropriate use of force."

24 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay.

25 MR. CUMMINGS: We're going to shoot them if we -- I

1 didn't think they'd be getting so close that we need to  
2 shoot them.

3 MEMBER OF PANEL: David?

4 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: No, we're going to do the public  
5 comment period --

6 MR. CUMMINGS: Okay. Anyway, thank you for your  
7 time.

8 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: -- with a few responses where  
9 necessary and then go from there. I guess, I'll come  
10 back to that one next. Rita Conn, please. I'm sorry.  
11 You're absolutely right. Jennifer Massey and then Rita  
12 Conn.

13 MS. MASSEY: I'll be very quick. I won't use up  
14 the three minutes. But thank you so much to all of  
15 you, we very much appreciate your listening to our  
16 comments. Just very quickly, is it -- it's my  
17 understanding that Holtec, that you will bury nuclear  
18 waste in Holtec canisters underground at San Onofre?

19 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Why don't you make your comment  
20 including the questions?

21 MS. MASSEY: Oh, because --

22 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: And I'll make sure they can  
23 answer it.

24 MS. MASSEY: -- that's what I sort of thought  
25 because if that's the case, then it's been commented to

1 me that it doesn't seem to be the greatest idea in the  
2 world considering San Onofre sits very close to the  
3 three earthquake faults and the canisters could be  
4 disturbed if they're buried underground and a bad  
5 earthquake hits, which is supposedly we're overdue for.

6 And, you know, talking about what Pam had to  
7 say about airplanes, I used to fly airplanes and, you  
8 know, if you take off from San Onofre -- from Orange  
9 County Airport, you could probably be in San Onofre in  
10 about 10 minutes. And I remember the movie "United  
11 193," and what a mess everybody made of trying to  
12 intercept that plane and where are all these planes  
13 anyway.

14 Do you think, say, within 10 minutes that you  
15 can have a conversation with the pilot and if his  
16 response isn't appropriate or adequate or not to your  
17 liking that you will then -- I want to know what you  
18 plan to do to take that plane down before it flies into  
19 San Onofre? And then finally, I was at the  
20 San Clemente Presbyterian Church for an Edison event  
21 not very long ago and I'm speaking to somebody who had  
22 some badge on and asked them about the evacuation or  
23 something, she said, "Oh, there's no plan for  
24 evacuation anymore." I said, "really? I hadn't heard  
25 that."

1 I said, "Well, what is the public suppose to  
2 do?" And this woman said, "When the siren goes off,  
3 you're suppose to turn on the radio." And I said,  
4 "What channel?" And she said, "Oh, I don't know." And  
5 I said "FM or AM." She said, "I think it's FM." But I  
6 said, "But you know what I think it would be really  
7 helpful. We have a free newspaper that's dropped on  
8 our garage driveway every Thursday. I think it might  
9 be helpful if you published that information to the  
10 general public because I'm unaware of it and maybe  
11 there's some others that are also unaware of it and it  
12 would be helpful, so we know what to do in case  
13 something happened. Thank you.

14 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay. Thank you very much. I  
15 think we've had a full discussion of the issues around  
16 interdiction of the aircraft because that's really  
17 other agencies. Tom, do you want to comment very  
18 briefly on the issue of emergency preparedness?

19 MR. PALMISANO: Sure. In fact, we've just, I  
20 think, recently had our annual mailing on emergency  
21 preparedness, so today we're under the operating plan  
22 emergency plan, and there are evacuation requirements  
23 in the -- the annual mailing for the folks in the  
24 10-mile emergency planning zone. I think, at least, if  
25 I remember, it has recently gone out in the last

1 several months.

2           So we do communicate that and we -- on our  
3 SONGScommunity.com we can get you to that information.  
4 Okay. I think what you're hearing is the emergency  
5 plans that change once you're decommissioned, after the  
6 NRC approves them, change the off-site requirements.  
7 That's what we discussed last summer in several  
8 meetings and I'll be glad to discuss those further as  
9 we get closer to that time. And, again, that is also  
10 on SONGScommunity.com.

11           CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay. Thank you very much. And  
12 there's also an unsigned comment on this report that  
13 there was a question about whether Yucca Mountain is  
14 still proceeding and whether and how we can put  
15 pressure on the NRC and other federal agencies to  
16 continue in that process.

17           The environmental licensing of Yucca is  
18 proceeding. It needs to be funded. It is not fully  
19 funded, and so this is a constant kind of cat and  
20 mouse, or whatever, choose your metaphor, in  
21 Washington. It may be that the odds of Yucca Mountain  
22 are going up with the changes in Nevada, it may be that  
23 they're going down. I think the spirit of what we're  
24 talking about here is, keep pressure on Washington, but  
25 work on other options at the same time. And so that

1 was that comment there.

2 I want to ask Rita Conn and then Berton Moldow  
3 to comment. Berton wants to talk about Laguna Woods.  
4 And Rita Conn.

5 MS. CONN: Thank you, Dr. Victor. Before I talk  
6 about security, I just wanted to read something that  
7 was said by one of the NRC's in Chicago, the inspector  
8 for dry storage or the inspector for dry storage cask,  
9 and it's particularly concerning because it's in  
10 regards to Holtec, and what he said was that "Holtec,  
11 as far as I'm concerned, has a non-effective quality  
12 assurance program."

13 This same kind of thinking led to NASA's space  
14 shuttle disaster and he, therefore, would not sign off  
15 on something that the NRC asked him to sign off on in  
16 regards to whistle blower Oscar Sherani's concerns  
17 about the manufacturing process of Holtec. I'd be  
18 happy to provide those concerns with anyone.

19 The next thing that I wanted to talk about is,  
20 there is a lot of money going on in the nuclear energy  
21 industry. This is just a full page ad that was taken  
22 out of the New York Times this week in which they are  
23 encouraging everyone to vote for those candidates that  
24 support nuclear energy.

25 And I think it is this kind of thing that also

1 went on, not only in this country, but it goes on -- it  
2 went on in Japan and it was part of what Japan's  
3 six-month investigation showed, is that -- is that  
4 Tepko knew about all of the problems.

5           They were forewarned, but because of profits  
6 over public safety, they did not fix it and it was  
7 because of collusion going on between elected  
8 officials, their regulating energy -- their regulating  
9 commissions, like our NRC or DOE, that those never  
10 happen because there is so much money in this industry  
11 that the public is not always protected.

12           We had a lovely meeting with Tom and then we  
13 went back because this is what we found on a nice  
14 Sunday and Bren will show you this picture. I believe  
15 that what it shows is that I hope I have all these  
16 terms right that you talked about, but that the  
17 owner-controlled area had no control. There was no one  
18 in the guard towers.

19           You might want to show it to the public.

20           There was no one in the gate. We were able to  
21 be there and we took pictures of the guard tower, the  
22 reactors, domes with the spent fuel pools behind them,  
23 we were able to actually go up to another area at which  
24 time someone did tell us no pictures. I talked to him.  
25 Told him we had seen Tom, "yada-yada-yada." And he

1 said, "Okay. You can stay 5 minutes, but no pictures."

2 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay.

3 MS. CONN: There was no investigation. I know my  
4 time is up. There was no investigation as to what was  
5 in our car. Thank God we were well-intended.

6 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Thank you.

7 MR. PALMISANO: Listen, David, I can't let that one  
8 go.

9 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Tom?

10 MR. PALMISANO: Let's see where she was.

11 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Can you just briefly reply and  
12 then if there's additional information we need to  
13 provide, why don't we do that?

14 MR. QUAM: So that picture that we're shown, that's  
15 taken from Highway 101, which is a public access road  
16 and that's not a guard tower.

17 MEMBER OF PUBLIC: No, it was taken at your south  
18 gate.

19 MR. QUAM: Yes, it is the south gate, which is  
20 along the side of 101.

21 MR. PALMISANO: And it's outside the  
22 owner-controlled area.

23 MS. CONN: And then we went into the  
24 owner-controlled part.

25 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay. One brief comment here and

1 then I want to just -- if you want to provide the  
2 photographs, we'll get another response to you, but it  
3 sounds like there's some disagreement as to where you  
4 were actually standing.

5 MR. QUAM: Correct, that is a public access point.  
6 The other picture, that scene, that was taken at the  
7 north end, of what we call parking lot 4, we have a  
8 search area up there, that's also another area to  
9 access another part of the Camp Pendleton beach. It's  
10 a public access road.

11 We have pictures -- people go out to the bluff  
12 and take pictures all the time. It's not a gated  
13 portion of the OCA.

14 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay. We're not going to  
15 continue because we do not have any more time. We have  
16 other people who are on the list.

17 MEMBER OF PUBLIC: (Inaudible.)

18 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: We are not going to continue  
19 this.

20 MEMBER OF PUBLIC: (Inaudible.)

21 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: We are not going to continue  
22 this. You've made your point and I thank you for  
23 making your point. You provided photographs.

24 MEMBER OF PUBLIC: Are you angry?

25 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: No, I'm not. I'm just asking

1 that everybody follow the procedure. That strikes me  
2 as a really inappropriate comment, sir.

3 Berton Moldow, please.

4 MR. MOLDOU: I'm a director of one of the HOAs at  
5 Laguna Woods, and because of some of the things that  
6 I've worked on, the city counsel finally recognized the  
7 danger that existed with San Onofre, in particular, now  
8 the waste storage, and they had passed a resolution,  
9 and I don't know whether you have seen the resolution  
10 or not.

11 Basically, they said, No. 1, we want to have  
12 the waste removed as soon as possible. Okay. And,  
13 No. 2, in the interim, they want the canister storage  
14 to be as safe as it possibly can. Now, with regard to  
15 No. 1, removal, we know that the permanent site is not  
16 there and what we're saying is "Why isn't there a  
17 temporary site?"

18 Certainly, you know, we have 50 canisters  
19 sitting there right now. We have areas within the  
20 State of California that are dry, we have a site that  
21 is secured, we have a site that has a no-fly zone that  
22 is huge, and I'm referring to China Lake. The Navy  
23 owns 1,100,000 acres of which the majority of that land  
24 is undeveloped.

25 The Marine Corps. had their turn. Why not let

1 the Navy have their turn? And by the way, they're  
2 generating waste anyway, so maybe they can use it. So  
3 it's something to look at. I think there are other  
4 interim sites that we could look at and we certainly  
5 should do that immediately and at least get rid of  
6 those first 50 canisters.

7 Okay. The second issue has to do with the  
8 Holtec System. We, as rate payers, you know, have been  
9 on the hook for a 3.3 billion dollar rate that we will  
10 have to pay because, quote, We wound up with a steam  
11 generator, okay, which design was faulty and it was an  
12 unproven design.

13 And I looked at the canisters that we're  
14 proposing and the system that we are proposing and I  
15 say, again, "My God. This is an unproven design. What  
16 are we in for? Are we in for another 3.3 billion  
17 dollars?" Okay. Holtec's president said "These  
18 canisters cannot be repaired."

19 And I said, "Oh, that's terrific. What's the  
20 solution? Well, solution is, you know, Russian dolls.  
21 You just get a bigger container and you put that little  
22 container into the bigger container; that's not a  
23 solution, that's a Band-aid. That's it. Thank you.

24 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay. Thank you very much. I  
25 think a number of people have seen the Laguna Woods

1 resolution, but if you would do me the favor of sending  
2 it to me by email or something, then I'll make sure  
3 that the whole CEP sees it. We'll make it available on  
4 the public site. Thank you very much for your comment.

5 Jay Steinmetor and then Ray Lutz and Bruce  
6 Campbell.

7 MR. STEINMETOR: Good evening and thanks for having  
8 this meeting, I appreciate it, to voice our opinions.  
9 I wanted to stress the fact that I'm in total  
10 disagreement in Holtec expecting -- excuse me --  
11 Southern California expecting to go to the California  
12 Public Utilities commission and get 1.3 billion dollars  
13 to purchase this system when they know, when they  
14 requested that, that it had yet to be approved by the  
15 Nuclear Regulatory Commission for seismic concerns.

16 They were told by Judge Darling that they  
17 needed to have approval from the NRC before asking for  
18 the decommissioning funds. But when they asked for the  
19 money, they failed to let anybody know at the CPUC that  
20 they had not got this approval yet.

21 Now, there is a different judge. Okay. And  
22 the same CPUC commissioner that was kicked off the last  
23 case is now judging this. So let me be clear, after  
24 the four failed steam generators, a 670 million dollars  
25 debacle, which resulted in a 3.3 billion dollar bill

1 for the rate payers, I am without question questioning  
2 your integrity, Southern California Edison.

3 MEMBER OF PUBLIC: Yes.

4 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Please just -- please make your  
5 comment.

6 MR. STEINMETOR: It's crazy that we should be asked  
7 actually go forth with this 1.3 billion dollar contract  
8 that is sealed and we cannot look into it. This is the  
9 rate payer's money and it is held in a fund by the CPUC  
10 for our protection. We should be able to evaluate that  
11 contract. We should know what's in it. We should know  
12 how many canisters you're buying. We should know  
13 whether you're replacing the old ones.

14 It is wrong that that should be sealed and we  
15 should not have access to it. And anybody on this  
16 panel who is not insisting on that is failing the  
17 public.

18 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay. Thank you for your  
19 comment. The comment, I think, deals in large part  
20 with issues in front of the CPUC and I'd really leave  
21 the CPUC and the public to talk about this. This panel  
22 is not in a position to provide the financial, the  
23 proper financial oversight to this process.

24 And I know Ray Lutz, among others, has been  
25 urging us to do this. There are other folks who are

1 doing this. We're not staffed up to do that kind of  
2 function. The issues you raised, though, about Holtec  
3 and about that system, we will be coming back to as  
4 regards to security and the safety and inspections and  
5 so on, and that's part what people are concerned about  
6 and I totally understand that.

7 And we have demanded that information and  
8 we'll come -- and we will put it in front of you and  
9 have a chance to talk about it. I want to underscore  
10 one thing that was in Tom's slide, which is, in  
11 September of this year, 2015, it is expected as a  
12 normal part of the regulatory process that Holtec get a  
13 seismic approval.

14 So, I think, what I've seen reported in the  
15 papers about how this is kind of a wild or unregulated  
16 or unapproved system strikes me as somewhat outside the  
17 bounds of what's actually going on as a matter of  
18 regulatory procedure.

19 Ray Lutz, the floor is yours.

20 MR. LUTZ: Ray Lutz with Citizens Oversight. I'm  
21 kind of disturbed a little bit about how this body  
22 continues to come across as if you are a  
23 decision-making body, which you decided that you're  
24 not, and everyone here should understand that this body  
25 is not going to represent you.

1 David Victor is not representing you. The  
2 only people that can represent you, and that's every  
3 person in this room, including the entire audience, is  
4 yourself or a group that you're with because this body  
5 is not -- is not a representative body.

6 So, what you should be encouraging this body  
7 -- this body should be encouraging members of the  
8 public to formulate their own documents and bring those  
9 forward to these other decision makers. I encourage  
10 everybody here to contact your public officials, not  
11 the people on this room, the people up in Sacramento  
12 that need -- that need to deal with this problem.

13 Citizens Oversight will be sending a letter up  
14 to the California Energy Commission regarding this idea  
15 that we've been pushing for months and months and  
16 months so, I guess, a year or more, to have a separate  
17 interim storage area.

18 I'm really happy that some of you have come on  
19 board with this. California Energy Commission, the  
20 public -- the California Public Utilities Commission,  
21 Department of Energy, Governor's office, Nuclear  
22 Regulatory Commission, State Senate Committee on  
23 Energy, utilities and Communications, and the Assembly  
24 Committee on utilities and Commerce, all these are  
25 specifically tasked with this job.

1           And it's not the job of this body to do  
2 anything except to go to these people that are tasked  
3 with this job and pound on their door and make sure  
4 that they do it. And it is not David Victor's job to  
5 do it for us. And that is -- that's what comes across.  
6 We've got the paper. If it's okay with everyone, we're  
7 going to be bringing it up there to promote it.

8           No. Everybody here has to do it yourself.  
9 Everybody here who is a representative of the people,  
10 who is an elected official from the local communities,  
11 get on the horn and get you going. It's your job to be  
12 representing your people in contacting them.

13           They're very sensitive to it. If you call up  
14 the Senate Committee they answer the phone within the  
15 first ring and they want -- and they know exactly how  
16 many people have called about each issue. And if you  
17 start calling them about these issues, they will know  
18 about it.

19           Now, Yucca Mountain is not big enough to  
20 hold -- house all the waste, all the dream about  
21 opening up and suddenly it's a solution, it's not.  
22 It's over capacity. Even if we had it, it wouldn't all  
23 fit in there. We'd still have a problem.

24           Water is another issue that I'm concerned  
25 about and I put in a request to stop everything at this

1 plant until the water situation is planned. We're  
2 under drought conditions right now and there's been  
3 zero planning that I've seen about the water use in  
4 this decommissioning project, so I want to see that  
5 dealt with and that's been a request.

6 Finally --

7 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Thank -- thank you.

8 MR. LUTZ: The last 10 minutes you said I could  
9 have.

10 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: What?

11 MR. LUTZ: The secured area -- since you didn't  
12 bring it up, I'm going to do it now, David. I asked  
13 you to earlier. The secured area in the picture that I  
14 saw does not include the ISFSI, so I want to get that  
15 answered. Thank you.

16 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: I think I'm concerned about the  
17 tone of our discussions here and I can totally  
18 appreciate. This is not a decision-making body. We  
19 said that in the beginning and we said that at the  
20 beginning of every one of these meetings. We are not  
21 trying to get in the way of anybody wanting to go to  
22 Sacramento; quite the opposite.

23 The problem here is, we can't just spread  
24 around ideas. We have a very practical problem here,  
25 which is, we want to find a way to get the waste out of

1 here as quickly as possible. So we should all be  
2 calling Sacramento with some sense of what we want  
3 Sacramento to do; that's what we're trying to help  
4 with.

5 That's not David Victor, Dan Stetson, and Tim  
6 Brown trying to take over this process. We're just  
7 volunteers, part of a panel of 18, who are trying to  
8 help us in this communities focus around some ideas  
9 that work; that's the idea.

10 Bruce Campbell, the floor is yours.

11 MR. CAMPBELL: Thank you. Oops. There have been  
12 too many -- I'm Bruce Campbell from the Northern part  
13 of the Newport-Inglewood Fault. There have been too  
14 many worker layoffs which may compromise safety at  
15 San Onofre. I have more concerns about the ethical  
16 fiber and motivations of utility executives and their  
17 lackeys as much as the mind-set of nuclear facility  
18 workers.

19 Would there be a difference between -- I want  
20 to -- you can answer this at the end of my comments, if  
21 you'd like. Would there be much different between fire  
22 at a spent fuel pool containing high burnup fuel and a  
23 fire at a spent fuel pool which does not have high  
24 burnup fuel?

25 Let's just assume that the spent fuel pools

1 being compared have spent fuel which have been out of  
2 the reactor for a similar length of time. I think it's  
3 reckless to -- and a hazard to workers to move the  
4 spent fuel rods into whatever cask in fast track  
5 process. Let it cool down for a while, specially for  
6 the high burnup fuel, which is what it's been used in  
7 recent years.

8           And so I believe it's reckless to move the  
9 spent fuel in a fast track manner and if it's moved  
10 into a dry cask, it should be the German dry cask,  
11 which has a pretty good track record, it seems. And I  
12 believe it's reckless to transport the spent fuel in  
13 faulty casks even if it was going to a reasonable  
14 destination.

15           Nuclear power facilities already have their  
16 waste consolidated more densely than they were designed  
17 for. The casks -- the casks are so huge that all those  
18 fuel assemblies even in a single cask can almost be  
19 considered consolidation.

20           During the Ward Balley "rad waste" struggle,  
21 some had offered the biomed-biotech industry monitor  
22 and retrieval storage for the small percent of  
23 California's rad waste that they made. They almost  
24 went for it, but then the nuclear power industry  
25 whipped them into line, so they did not support such a

1 facility, the monitored retrievable storage.

2 Dr. Singh of Holtec admits that a microscopic  
3 through-wall crack can release millions of curies of  
4 radiation and that, apparently, they cannot be  
5 repaired. Is this the faith of a swell company who  
6 hasn't been approved by the NRC?

7 Also, I noticed these agencies and industries,  
8 they say, "Oh, yeah, the seismic approval is coming in  
9 September." It's as if they already know it's the --  
10 they know it's the nuclear regulatory -- rubber stamp,  
11 rubber stamp, rubber stamp. So they know things --  
12 anyway, it's suppose to be -- we're weighing the  
13 concern. Should we approve this? Let's look at the  
14 data and concerns. But instead it's "We're going to  
15 approve it," to help those utilities and, of course,  
16 nuclear power has been an excused for the nuclear  
17 weapons program since 1945 or well nuclear power  
18 development from the 50s, justifying having lots of  
19 weapons.

20 The integrity of transporters and the variety  
21 of casks must be ascertained before moving the rods.  
22 However, due to so many people and important farmland  
23 the other things in Southern California, I do think --  
24 and Central, I do think California rad waste should be  
25 moved very carefully and safely in the best German

1 casks, perhaps in the 20 to 30 year time frame.

2 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay.

3 MR. CAMPBELL: But I don't -- I don't support  
4 state-wide consolidated dump, that's basically a  
5 license to make more rad waste.

6 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Thank you. Thank you for your  
7 comments.

8 MR. CAMPBELL: And then Yucca Mountain isn't a  
9 spot, it's in a volcanic and seismically active area on  
10 the Ghost Dance Fault, the Ghost Dance Fault.

11 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Thank you for your comments. You  
12 mentioned, as part of your remarks about -- concerns  
13 about unemployment and workers, and I just want to --  
14 the last comment I want to report is not signed. Is  
15 concern that -- about will SCE outsource jobs through  
16 the Holtec/Areva to other than American workers?

17 And I want to show you, we had a very helpful  
18 exchange with Jerry Kern and his communities have been  
19 affected by the plant's closure and will make that  
20 exchange part of the public record. We also have as  
21 one of our meetings later this year, maybe we can get  
22 the next slide, I just want to remind everybody of the  
23 two upcoming regular meetings in the CEP: The one in  
24 July is going to focus on environmental review process,  
25 including some very important coastal issues, there are

1 a lot of very important environmental questions,  
2 environmental impact questions, including NEPA and CEQA  
3 reviews; those will be the subject of that meeting in  
4 July.

5 And the meeting in late October will be  
6 directly on this issue of economic impact, the economic  
7 impact of decommissioning, the economic impact of the  
8 process of decommissioning itself will be a job  
9 creator, and we'll have an opportunity to focus  
10 conversations about how to make sure that as many of  
11 those jobs stay in the local communities as possible.

12 So I want to quickly see if there are any last  
13 points the members of the CEP want to make. I know  
14 we're running a little bit over, but we got started a  
15 little bit later. Gary?

16 MR. BROWN: Yeah, but I think a lot of good  
17 comments were made here tonight. And one thing, we've  
18 all heard a lot about Holtec and you've assured us that  
19 we're going to have another meeting and get further  
20 into it. In the newspaper, we've seen schematics of  
21 how the Holtec system is going to -- going to work and  
22 how it's buried and stuff.

23 You know, I would like to see that same  
24 schematic, but I would like to see a study or an  
25 analysis done on what elements of that schematic is

1 beta tested, it's new. It hasn't been proven before,  
2 because I think that's -- that's a big question and  
3 we've never really approached it from that -- from that  
4 standpoint.

5 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay.

6 MR. BROWN: You know, we're under the impression  
7 that so much is proven -- proven technology, there is  
8 data out there, but I -- I want to know specifically  
9 what isn't proven.

10 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: So let me just commit again to  
11 undertake. I don't know if the data can be organized  
12 quite that way because --

13 MR. BROWN: Okay.

14 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: -- part of what's new is, as I  
15 understand the way the systems are put together and  
16 some of what's new is actually internally to the  
17 canister the way the racks are and so on, but I will  
18 commit and make sure, not because I'm trying to take  
19 over the process, I'm just trying to help us be  
20 organized and efficient.

21 I will commit that we will make sure that  
22 Edison and Holtec show us what this "Defense in Depth"  
23 looks like and we'll also get a sense of the parts of  
24 the system where there's a lot of experience and where  
25 there's less experience, and I think that's the spirit

1 of some of the comments about being able to inspect  
2 concrete, that Donna and other have made and so on.

3 I want to say two last words about the Holtec  
4 System: I've seen in the newspaper this 1.3 billion  
5 dollar figure, my understanding that that's a figure  
6 that's been taken from the decommissioning cost  
7 estimate, including the cost override, the amount of  
8 money that's built in as a cushion for potential cost  
9 overrides.

10 That's not a check that gets sent to Holtec,  
11 that's the entire process of moving the fuel out,  
12 building the pad and so on, and the part of it that is  
13 the canisters, we don't know exactly because this is a  
14 private, confidential contract, but it's probably on  
15 the order of a 100-150 million dollars or something  
16 like that and the actual canister is part of that.

17 So I just want to make --

18 MEMBER OF PUBLIC: (Inaudible.)

19 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: I just want to make sure that we  
20 don't mix apples and oranges when we see this 1.3  
21 billion figure and people start talking about having to  
22 pay that multiple times.

23 MEMBER OF PUBLIC: 1.3 that was my statement. The  
24 intent of the 1.3 was to accommodate the cost related,  
25 not just the canisters.

1 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: And --

2 MR. PALMISANO: Let me clarify, we did the  
3 decommissioning cost and 1.3 billion is the estimate to  
4 manage spent fuel between now and 2052.

5 MEMBER OF PUBLIC: Right.

6 MR. PALMISANO: So it's not just the Holtec System,  
7 it includes the Holtec System in that whole  
8 decommissioning cost estimate of 4.4 billion, that 1.3  
9 billion piece is the spent fuel management cost between  
10 now and 2052 when it's presumed all the fuel is off  
11 site. I'll be glad, at a future meeting, to get back  
12 into the cost estimate of that as well.

13 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Thank you. When we get back -- I  
14 need to -- we need to -- we need to --

15 MS. GILMORE: (Inaudible.)

16 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Donna, we need to --

17 MS. GILMORE: (Inaudible.)

18 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: We need to close -- Donna? We  
19 need to close the meeting. I wanted to see if there  
20 are any other members of the CEP who want to put last  
21 items on the agenda here.

22 When we come back to this issue of what  
23 defense in depth looks like at the Holtec System, we  
24 will also come back to this item that's been attributed  
25 to Mr. Singh multiple times, that you cannot fix the

1 canisters.

2 That was -- that happened in this room and I  
3 was sitting in this chair with Chris Singh, sitting  
4 right there, and I just want to -- the context was, if  
5 you discover the conditions that might lead to a crack,  
6 what would you do?

7 And the question in front of people was, would  
8 you try and weld it and fix it? which is one possible  
9 strategy, or would you just try and take the canister  
10 and do the dolls approach and put it in a transport  
11 canister? or, as Chris Singh said, after he made this  
12 remark that he's been misquoted about, "Would you take  
13 the fuel out and put it into a new canister?"

14 So I just -- we will come back to this issue,  
15 but it is very, very important that we think about the  
16 whole system and how the whole system operates as  
17 opposed to plucking individual facts out of individual  
18 comments out -- out of context.

19 MEMBER OF PUBLIC: The video is on the website, if  
20 you want to hear it.

21 CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Thank you very much. This has  
22 been not the easiest meeting and appreciate everybody's  
23 patience and contributions. These are not easy issues,  
24 but we're working on them. And thank you all for your  
25 assistance in that process.

1 (Whereupon the CEP meeting concluded at 9:07 p.m.)

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